

Albion College

Class

Accession

DA
566

.7

.W5

International Relations Club

DA

566

.7

.W5

Willert

Aspects of British
foreign policy.

34795

3 19 2

LEWIS PULSIPHER.

120

WITHDRAWN
FROM
ALBION COLLEGE LIBRARY

STOCKWELL-MUDD LIBRARIES

DA566.7.W5

Aspects of British foreign policy



3 5044 00325 2282

THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS PUBLICATIONS
WILLIAMS COLLEGE, WILLIAMSTOWN, MASS.

ASPECTS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

*OTHER INSTITUTE OF POLITICS PUBLICATIONS
ISSUED BY YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS*

ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCES OF THE INSTITUTE OF
POLITICS AT ITS FIRST SESSION 1921

THE RECENT AIMS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
JAPAN. BY RIKITARO FUJISAWA, PH.D.

THE PREVENTION OF WAR. BY PHILIP KERR AND LIONEL
CURTIS

GERMANY AND EUROPE. BY COUNT HARRY KESSLER

THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER MODERN
DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONS. BY DEWITT C. POOLE

THE GREATEST EXPERIMENT IN HISTORY. BY SIR ED-
WARD GRIGG

APPROACHES TO WORLD PROBLEMS. BY THE EARL OF
BIRKENHEAD, GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS, PHILIP KERR

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE. BY LOUIS AUBERT

THE REAWAKENING OF THE ORIENT. BY SIR VALENTINE
CHIROL, YUSUKE TSURUMI, SIR JAMES ARTHUR SALTER

THE BRITISH LABOR MOVEMENT. BY R. H. TAWNEY

THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY. BY DR. MORITZ
JULIUS BONN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS VIEWED FROM GENEVA.
BY WILLIAM E. RAPPARD

ITALY, THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRA-
NEAN. BY COUNT ANTONIO CIPPICO

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION. BY A. MENDELSSOHN-BAR-
THOLDY

ASPECTS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

BY

SIR ARTHUR WILLERT

*Chief of the Press Bureau
Foreign Office, London*

NEW HAVEN

PUBLISHED FOR THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS
BY THE YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON • HUMPHREY MILFORD • OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

MCMXXVIII

Copyright 1928 by Yale University Press.

Printed in the United States of America.

DA

566

. 7

-W5

34795

PREFACE

THE addresses which appear in this volume were delivered at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown by a member of the Foreign Office in London. They must not, however, be regarded for that reason as an official exposition of British foreign policy. Their author, in collecting the data upon which they are based, naturally drew upon the official sources at his disposal. But he came to the United States with the permission of his superiors to say what he liked and free to pick any subjects he liked and to deal with them as he saw fit. Responsibility for expressions of opinion, interpretation of events and so on must, therefore, rest upon his shoulders alone.

The addresses were indeed finally prepared only after their author reached Williamstown, with the assistance of the clerical staff of the Institute of Politics, to whose most efficient coöperation this opportunity is taken of paying grateful tribute. Such references as they contain to the present and the future were, therefore, made in the last week of July and in the first three weeks of August, 1927.

CONTENTS

I. "PEACE, SECURITY, AND TRADE"	1
II. PEACE WITHOUT SECURITY	24
III. THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE	47
IV. BRITISH POLICY IN CHINA. THE RISE OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT	67
V. CONCESSION AND CONCILIATION IN CHINA	89
VI. THE RUSSIAN QUESTION	111
INDEX	135

I

“PEACE, SECURITY, AND TRADE”

I AM going to speak to you in these lectures about contemporary British diplomacy. I propose to try to give you some idea of the objects of that diplomacy, of the reasons for those objects, and of the means whereby we have been, and are, striving to attain them.

I will not pretend that I am always going to succeed in being dispassionately objective. One cannot be objective about the affairs of one's own country. One cannot work in an organization and under chiefs whose policy one heartily admires, and remain dispassionate. But I am going to try to talk to you less as a diplomatist and as the head of a department of a British Government office than as one whose training has really been that of a journalist and whose most formative working years were spent in this country as the correspondent of our greatest English newspaper, studying your politics and policies, and above all your contacts with the outside world.

If the task I have set myself is somewhat complicated, I have at any rate one consolation. There never can have been a time when it was more satisfactory than it is now to discuss our foreign relations before a non-British audience. A few years ago it would have been an embarrassing business for one who, through the nature of his work, is compelled to an intimate study of those relations. It would have involved either the whitening of sepulchres full of the bones of unsuccessful ventures or the confession

that, though its objective was as sound as it had ever been, our diplomacy was unable to assert itself in a world still distracted by the nightmare from which it has just awakened. Now, on the other hand, one can afford oneself the luxury of frank speaking without the danger of suddenly finding oneself washing on an alien housetop linen better kept for the depths of the domestic laundry.

If I may borrow from the language of your politics, the three chief planks upon which any British foreign minister must now stand are: "Peace, security, and trade." Peace and security are to all nations the first essentials, but to us perhaps more than to any other nation they are a means to an end as well as an end in themselves. We need a peaceful world, because we are above everything a trading nation. We want security for other nations as much as for ourselves because a feeling of settled safety among nations not only minimizes the danger of war but stimulates trade.

We also want the security of our trade routes on the high seas. Our ocean trade routes are for us what your railways are for you. They interconnect the units of our commonwealth and bring the necessities of life to the most thickly populated parts of the Empire. Block the avenues of food supply which radiate from the British Islands, and it is all up with us—as we were not so very far from finding out just ten years ago.

But I have anticipated subjects to which I shall presently have to return. All I want to make clear for the moment is that our foreign policy is based upon a very real national necessity. I do not mean to imply that it has not other and more altruistic as-

pects. In common with all Englishmen I believe that there is usually a sense of right and wrong, of decency, of desire to help, of "service," or whatever you like to call it, in our dealings with other nations, especially when they are weak, or backward, or in trouble. I like to think that we have not lost that streak of sentiment, that instinctive faith in the efficacy of free institutions and in the right of all men to enjoy them—that love of fair play, that sympathy with the "under dog," which made the elder Pitt, the most aggressively patriotic of our statesmen, speak those glowing words of sympathy with the American colonists when the shadow of the War of Independence first fell athwart the House of Commons, which made Burke dedicate to the same subject perhaps the most splendid passage of all of that wonderful oratory of his that has come down to us, which inspired our support of Italy and Greece and other nationalities struggling to throw off an alien yoke. One likes to think that we are, in our treatment of the backward races under our control, actuated by something finer than a desire to exploit, that the "white man's burden" is to us something more than the phrase of a patriotic poet.

I want, however, in these lectures to concentrate upon the practical motives and manifestations of our foreign policy. I want to do so for two reasons. I believe that one of the things which our two nations hold most in common is exactly that sense of altruistic decency which I have just been trying to describe, and that therefore I should be wasting your time if I dilated upon it. On the other hand, the practical sanction of our foreign policy is to a large extent one with which you are not familiar from your own ex-

perience as a nation. Also, I hope to be able to carry you with me in developing the argument that contemporary British policy really is of some service to the world, not in spite of its being based upon the realism of national necessity, but actually because it is based upon that realism. I should like to be able to do this by discussing the material, tangible aspects of that policy rather than its imponderables.

Let me explain what I mean by claiming that our diplomacy is useful to the world. Everybody is, I suppose, agreed that of all the problems which exercise mankind, the problem of war is the gravest. The progress which we have made towards the limitation of armament, the growing prestige of the League of Nations, the efficiency of international public utility organizations like the postal and telegraph services, the synthetic force of modern commerce and finance, all these things cannot obscure the fact that we have as yet succeeded in raising but the flimsiest of barriers against war.

Thomas Hobbes, that somewhat gloomy political philosopher of the seventeenth century, whose works many of us had to study in our younger days, attributed the formation of the state to the necessity that man has of living under a social compact. The individual was, he argued, bound if left to himself to make a mess of his own life and of the lives of his neighbors. "Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," he would make existence impossible by his coveting, fearing, quarrelling, and fighting. War was, in fact, his state of nature.

It is to be feared that internationally we are still nearer Hobbes' state of nature than most of us like to admit. War is still the ultimate arbiter between

nations. There is no getting away from that fact, humiliating and alarming as it is to us who are still suffering from the shock of one war and know that another war of the same dimensions would almost inevitably send our civilization reeling into the abyss.

What is it that still imposes the danger of war upon us? If one analyzes the causes which have prevented the smooth development of our civilization and have torn and tortured it and stunted its finer growths by constantly recurring wars, the conclusion is, I think, forced upon us that what we need above all is a more general recognition of the fact that the practical interests, the prosperity, the safety of one state is bound up in the collective well-being of all states.

Nations, to put it differently, must learn in their dealings with one another to be guided by the cult of the general good, in the same way as the individuals of any modern state are in their dealings with one another.

Our foreign policy is, I venture to submit, doing something constructive towards that end.

Great Britain after the War was very much in the position of a department store which has fallen on difficult times, mainly, but not entirely, owing to the fact that the territory which it serves had been devastated by some disaster. If the directors of the store are wise, they will spend as much time upon helping to revive the general prosperity of the community as they will upon their immediate affairs. For only when its customers have money in their pockets can the store recapture its prosperity.

The urgent necessities of our situation would

drive us relentlessly into the field of international affairs, even if our sense of duty and progress were atrophied. Our need for a peaceful world makes us work ceaselessly for a better understanding between the nations and for the elimination of possible points of friction. You must sometimes wonder when you read your morning paper why it is that Great Britain is nearly always active where trouble is brewing. The reason is that wars or rumors of war, quarrels or friction in any corner of the world spell loss to British trade and to British investors. It is largely for the sake of such interests that we are always endeavoring to pour oil on troubled waters. Any disturbance of the peace, however remote, is bound to hit us. Frontier disputes in northeastern Europe or in the Balkans concern us in one sense as little as they concern Spain or the Argentine, but war in those areas would concern us as much as it would a contiguous country.

Our intense interest in the outside world is due to the fact that we are not self-supporting. We have a population of some forty millions, in an island which, to be anything like a self-contained economic unit, ought probably not to have more than about half that number. Of our population the great bulk is industrial. We produce only about 30 per cent of the foodstuffs we need, the rest has to be bought and paid for abroad. It has to be bought, together with a vast amount of raw material, such as the cotton we get from you, primarily by the export of manufactured goods and coal. If we could not sell a sufficiency of these goods abroad, if our coal, iron and steel, textile, and other industries, were to find themselves thrown back on their home markets, then I think

every economist would agree that there would be no alternative for us except a slow decline, accompanied perhaps by some very unpleasant form of social readjustment while we got rid of that surplus population of ours. Even as things stand, we have had, since the War, an average of over one million unemployed.

The investments we still have abroad, the payments which we receive as mercantile carriers and international bankers and so on, the money that comes to us from the large international businesses in which it has long been the habit of our investors to put their savings, and other receipts from abroad might postpone the evil day, but sooner or later the time would come when ends would refuse to meet. Even now our almost uncomputable assets from sources such as I have just mentioned are being drawn upon each year to balance the discrepancy between the value of our imports and exports, and to meet certain payments from our annual revenue with which the War has saddled us.

Our difficulties cannot be entirely discounted as the result of the War and of nothing else. The War has increased them, but the shadow of their coming was already over the land before 1914. Their germ, in fact, lies in our history during the last century. The department store was beginning to sense hard times even before the purchasing power of its territory was impaired.

Just as the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War gave us a great ascendancy in the markets of the world during most of the nineteenth century, so the recent War, together with its aftermath of economic disturbances has emphasized and expe-

dited the decline of that ascendancy. Before 1789, France was still ahead of us in the race for the economic supremacy of the world as it then existed. Her exports and imports were larger than ours; her population amounted to nearly thirty million, whereas ours had not passed the ten million mark. By 1815 we were alone in the race, revolution and militant imperialism had put France far behind, and there was no other country to compete with us.

The Napoleonic War made England the workshop of the world. While armies were marching and fighting and destroying backwards and forwards over Europe, England, despite her decisive interventions in the war, never had her resources either of men or money very seriously taxed. While conscription and casualties were emptying the towns of the continent, her cities were humming with newly built factories equipped with the earlier of those inventions which were destined to produce mass production and the modern state.

Our industrial position at the end of the Napoleonic War can, with the necessary differences, be compared with yours at the end of the Civil War. Each country was ready for its opportunity. The United States was ready for the tumultuously prosperous development of the resources of a rich, untouched continent by and for a rapidly increasing population. Great Britain was ready for the rôle of the virtually monopolistic purveyor of wares of which the modern world stood more and more in need.

By the end of the last century there was no longer any parallel between the industrial positions of the two countries, except that in both industrial development had been very great. The American producer

still had a continent of his own to supply and controlled his markets behind the comfortable shelter of a protective tariff. The British producer, it is true, still had the markets of the world in which to sell his goods, but his ascendancy had gone, competitors undreamed of in the old days had sprung up right and left.

Your manufacturers had begun to reach a pitch of efficiency in mass production which enabled them to have something over from the domestic market for export. The German Empire was starting its era of commercial and industrial expansion. Modern Japan was beginning to give our textile people and other exporters anxious moments in the Far East. Other countries were finding their industrial feet and were beginning to compete with us, at any rate in their home markets. It was as though Pennsylvania and Ohio had suddenly been called upon to do competitive business not merely in a free-trade America, but in an America the states of which were at liberty to impose duties against their goods.

The situation was relieved by the immensity of the fields of trade in which competition had arisen, by the start which the British trader, shipowner, and banker had secured over his rivals, and by the fact that those rivals, notably Germany, who was one of our best customers before the War, tended to increase their purchases from us in the ratio of the growth of their prosperity. We had also the vast accumulated wealth of our investments abroad to fall back upon, the results of the savings of our commercial class in the days of its prosperity. But long before the War there were thinkers in England who wondered what price coming generations might

be destined to pay for the recklessness with which their nineteenth-century forbears had industrialized their country to exploit the opportunities of a passing phase.

The War converted the foreboding of the economists into the preoccupation of the statesmen. It wrecked our markets in every direction. It wiped out a large proportion of our investments abroad, notably in the United States. It found in Europe the most stable and highly developed mechanism for international trade and finance that had ever been evolved; it left Europe disorganized and dislocated, with more than one of its principal states tottering towards economic chaos. The collapse of European currencies, and still more the wild fluctuation of their values, rendered almost impossible the ordinary processes of credit and international finance, without which modern trade cannot be carried on. It piled Pelion upon the Ossa of our discomfiture by enabling our European rivals to produce incredibly cheaply and to undersell us. Especially in central Europe, moreover, the animosities of the War were prolonged into peace by trade and tariff restrictions on frontiers, many of which had not even existed in the old days.

Farther afield Russia had vanished from the economic map. In the Far East, nationalist ferment in India and China was impairing markets already injured by local competition. Elsewhere the ground we had lost during the War was not to be recaptured overnight.

Nor could the English-speaking nations of the Empire be called in to redress the balance. In the first place, their markets are still limited. In the second

place, the War had stimulated local industrial development, with the result that countries like Canada and Australia were themselves manufacturing goods which they used to get from us. In the third place, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's idea of an empire trading within itself under a system of thoroughgoing preference, had long gone by the board. Public opinion in the dominions, though willing to give the mother country reasonable preference, was averse from abandoning the right to buy in the cheapest and most convenient market; and public opinion at home was determined not to tolerate the tax upon non-imperial foodstuffs which, by common consent, would have to be the key of any comprehensive system of imperial preference.

Such are the chief material circumstances which since the War have made us work so hard for the economic reconstruction and political stabilization of Europe and, as I shall show in other lectures, have dominated until recently our Russian policy and still dominate our Chinese policy. Such are the considerations which have, one imagines, finally routed the British school of isolationists, people who a few years ago were still arguing that we ought to let Europe work out its own salvation, that in spite of the lessons of the War we ought not to be interested in its politics, and that we could get on without its trade.

But, it may be asked, even if our need of foreign trade does make us work hard for peace, may it not also breed less desirable forms of commercial aggressiveness? The question is a natural one, but I hope that I can reassure those who may be inclined to put it.

A politically aggressive trade policy, spheres of influence, the dragooning of weaker nations, the doctrine that trade follows the flag, and so on, are all offsprings of the old mercantilist theory. The essence of that theory can be described as monopoly, so far as foreign trade goes. It demanded that one of the first duties of governments should be the securing of exclusive trade privileges for their nationals by almost any means, by conquest and annexation if necessary, that foreign shipping should be penalized as much as possible, that colonies should trade only with the mother land, and that home industries should be protected by tariffs, and so on.

We do not now aim at monopoly in any branch of foreign trade. All we want and all our diplomacy is striving for is that we shall continue to get sufficient trade to support our overpopulated island. We abandoned the mercantilist theory root and branch long ago. In the early days of our industrial expansion we found that free trade, free shipping, the freest possible commercial intercourse in all parts of the world was what paid us best.

We did, for a time, continue to seek territory, spheres of influence, and so on, in the less civilized parts of the world. Our share in the partition of Africa marked the climax of the period of territorial acquisitiveness. After that the doctrine that trade follows the flag and the sphere of influence theory became progressively discredited. We acquiesced in the idea of spheres of influence in China for a time, but not for long, for, as you will remember, we accepted at the very end of the last century without any reservation whatsoever, the famous "open door"

policy enunciated by Mr. John Hay for the powers in China.

Since then, I think I can say that we have stood everywhere abroad for equal opportunities for everybody in matters of trade. At home the lack of a regular protective tariff, generally speaking, gives the foreign importer virtually the same opportunities as are open to the domestic producer. Abroad we supported the inclusion in the Covenant of the League of Nations of a clause laying it down that there shall be equal opportunity in mandated territories for the nationals of all countries which are members of the League of Nations. Indeed we went farther than that. As you probably know, we have negotiated with your government treaties giving to American citizens the benefit of that clause, though the United States is not a member of the League of Nations. Not that our action in that respect really strengthens my argument. Ordinary considerations of equity would have obliged us so to act towards a nation without whose participation in the War and in the Peace settlement the League of Nations might never have come into being.

There was a time when it was rather freely asserted that we discriminated against American interests, especially in the Near East, over oil. There may, for all I know, have been tussles between the American and British oil companies. But it can be emphatically said that the British Government has never discriminated against the American oil companies. For one thing, a corollary to the doctrine of free trading, which, as I said, we follow, is that the Government should interfere as little as possible with private trade and finance. For instance, we have

never gone since the War so far in the direction of paternalism as your State Department, I believe, did, when it intimated to American banking houses that it would prefer them not to lend money abroad without consulting it. As a matter of fact, the only instance I know of interference by our government with the affairs of our oil companies was when it prevailed upon some of them to give one of your companies an opportunity of acquiring a share in the Turkish Petroleum Company, the company which holds the concession for whatever oil there may be in northern Iraq or Mesopotamia.

What about rubber, then, some of you may be asking yourselves? What about those restrictions upon the output of that essential commodity of which we all have heard so much? In regard to that, one has, of course, to plead guilty to government interference. But let me assure you that it was not the malignant interference which it was sometimes represented to be against the American rubber interests.

What we did was, after the great slump in rubber prices in 1920, to enforce a scheme under which producers should only export a certain percentage of their standard production. But a scale was arranged whereby, as prices rose on account of this restriction upon the sale of rubber, the amount exported from our rubber growing territories should be automatically increased. The restriction was necessary to save many rubber plantations from ruin and from being turned back into the jungle. It is indeed highly probable that without it, rubber today would, owing to the disappearance of many plantations, stand at a higher figure than it does.

And in any case the restriction was not discriminatory. It operated against the British rubber people just as much as it did against the rubber people of the United States or of any other country. During the years that I was in Washington, the Department of Agriculture often preached the reduction of the acreage of cotton in the South by means of diversified farming, and I believe that since then there has been quite a campaign to restrict the cotton acreage, frankly in order to keep up the price of cotton. No foreigner has any right to criticize this campaign. The United States is obviously at liberty to raise as much or as little cotton as it likes, but in practice anything that increases the price of the American cotton crop reacts at once upon the prosperity of our Lancashire textile districts. I repeat that I am not for one moment grumbling at your doing what you like with your own economic affairs, but I would submit, to support the general line of my argument, that we have no national policy which prevents free trading so much as your policy of high protection, and that when it comes to trade discrimination, anything that you may do to raise the price of cotton works out in practice as a more direct and damaging discrimination against us than anything that we may have done to restrict temporarily the amount of rubber upon the markets of the world did against you.

To explain why it is that we favor free trading so strongly as a means towards economic reconstruction and development, let me quote a passage from a recent speech by Sir Arthur Salter, who as head of the Economic Section of the League of Nations is in the closest possible contact with the current tenden-

cies of international trade and finance. Sir Arthur Salter summed up the problem of post-war trade as follows:

The level of wealth and of average prosperity throughout the world at any moment depends upon three factors; firstly, the resources of nature; secondly, the capacity of man to exploit them; and thirdly the existence of a system which enables the products of one country or of one class to be exchanged without friction, without waste and without cost with the products of other countries and other classes.

The resources of nature are not reduced (as a result of the war). The capacity of man to exploit them is continually increasing. But what has happened essentially since the war is that the system of interchange has been interrupted, arrested, impeded, in some cases shattered. That is what has gone wrong in the world, and, if in following the history of the last eight years, we wish to arrive at accurate conclusions, we must always bear in mind the conception not of destruction but of disorganization, the idea not of too little production, not of the inadequacy of man or of nature but of the impediments to the interchange of goods between one set of specialists and another.

Is it likely, if Sir Arthur Salter's diagnosis is correct, that we, to whom a speedy recovery from this disorganization of the world's markets is so vitally important, would seek to impede it by making more difficult the interchange of goods between one nation and another? All we do in that direction is to impose temporary duties upon a few classes of manufactures in order to give our own people a chance of recapturing our domestic markets and even that little measure of protection is by no means universally popular at home.

We have in fact replaced the old mercantilist

theory of national monopoly and national hoarding and so on, by the principle that the prosperity of the individual nation must depend upon the prosperity of other nations in the ratio in which that nation depends upon its commercial contacts with the outside world.

So much for trade. Let us now turn to security. The inviolability of the British Islands constitutes the same problem today as it has for long years. All through modern history it has been wrapped up with the continental coast across the narrow seas. Napoleon was right when he said that Antwerp was a pistol pointed at the breast of England, as right as he was in that even more hackneyed remark of his which I might have taken as the text of these lectures, that we are a nation of shopkeepers. We can never afford to see Antwerp and those other neighboring seaports in the hands of a potentially hostile and aggressive power. There was a danger that they might be so held as long as Imperial Germany remained at war with us. That danger no longer exists.

Our nearest neighbor, the strongest remaining military power in western Europe, is solidly our friend. Despite the divergent policies we have at times pursued, despite differences in national outlook due at once to differences in temperament and differences in geographical position, one of the few sure prophecies that can be made about Europe is that there will be no war between us and France.

Apart from the sentimental tie of the memories of a great partnership in a great crisis, there are compelling material reasons for us to remain friends. As I have already said, a really settled Europe is essential to us, and the strongest possible guarantee for

a settled Europe is the coöperation of France and Great Britain for the maintenance of peace.

Our interests overseas also hold us together. Without our empire, Great Britain might shrink to the rank of a second-rate power. Without her African, to say nothing of her Asiatic empire, the same fate might in time of stress befall France, strong and self-contained though she be today. In time of war her intercourse with those empires and with the reservoir of man power and other resources which they would give her, depends upon the control of the seas. Thus, to have the friendship of her great naval neighbor surely means as much to her as her friendship does to us in making us comfortable about the control of the narrow seas and relatively secure from the air attacks of continental enemies.

But the safety of our islands avails us little if their population has not work and food, and unless we have in war time freedom of communication with the food-producing parts of the world and especially with the other countries of the Empire.

There are consequently two other aspects of our security policy. The one concerns Europe: the other our ocean communications. Since the War a great part of our diplomatic energy has been devoted to trying to coöperate with the European countries for the establishment on the continent of that feeling of safety and stability without which, as I have already said, there can be no real international peace. As I hope to show you in another lecture, we were for some years not very successful but in the end we were able to play a respectable part in the creation at Locarno of a fabric of interconnected treaties

which history will surely account as a decisive contribution to the rehabilitation of Europe.

Our security policy outside Europe mainly concerns the safeguarding of our water communications. The purely naval and military precautions which we are obliged to take to that end and of which we have lately been hearing so much are only one side of the picture, and are not subjects upon which I am qualified to dilate.

There is also the way in which considerations of imperial security react directly upon our diplomacy and upon our relations with some of the weaker countries.

Let me give you the leading example of what I mean. The Mediterranean is the strategic center of the Empire. If we lose our freedom of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, the backbone of our imperial polity is severed. Napoleon knew that in the old days. He invaded Egypt at the beginning of his career because, as he told the French Government, "really to ruin England we must make ourselves masters of Egypt." Later on, when England had become his chief and almost only enemy, he was constantly trying to strike her through the East. He curried favor with the Turks, he sent embassies to the Persians, he made an alliance with the Russians, all to that single end. Imperial Germany saw clearly that to compete with the British Empire it must bestir itself in the Near East. You all remember those striking visits which the ex-Kaiser paid to Turkey and Palestine and his appeals to the Moslem world. You all remember what importance Germany attached to her alliance with Turkey during the War, and how there

went out from Turkey an army to seize Egypt which happily never crossed the Suez Canal.

Everywhere in the Near East our chief interest is the security of the Empire, and its ocean routes. Our relations with Egypt center around our concern for the integrity of the Suez Canal. We do not want to own Egypt. Egypt was a British protectorate during the War after Turkey had lost her, but when the War was over, we hurried to make her a present of her autonomy. All we did was to preserve our right to protect her from foreign encroachments and interference and to keep troops in her territory to guard the Suez Canal. Our Egyptian problem today is to make that characteristic Anglo-Saxon compromise work in practice.

Imperial security enters largely into our relations with Persia. The object of our Persian policy is to strengthen the Government at Teheran so that it shall not be dominated by its great neighbor, Russia, and used by Russia in intrigues against India and the Empire. Nor would it suit us if by weakening the authority of the Persian Government, the Russians were able to stir up trouble in southern Persia and injure the great British oil wells there. Our policy in Afghanistan has long been a protective policy, first against the encroachments of the old Russian Empire and now against the encroachments of Bolshevized Russia.

We have been accused of abridging the national independence of countries such as those which I have just mentioned. I do not think that much support for that accusation can be found in the actual facts of our relationship with them, except in the case of Egypt, to which I will come in a minute or two.

I have already told you that the chief object of our Persian policy is to make the Teheran Government as strong as possible. If we had wanted to abridge the independence of Afghanistan we had a magnificent opportunity to do so in 1919, when under a new and irresponsible ruler, Afghanistan attacked India and was defeated after a short war. In the peace which followed, instead of curtailing the autonomy of Afghanistan, we actually gave back to her her independence in her foreign relations, which we had taken from her many years ago.

Iraq, for which we now hold a mandate from the League of Nations, is another country important to us from the point of view of our communications with India and Australasia, and on account of its propinquity to the oil fields of southern Persia. To Iraq we have promised complete independence as soon as the League of Nations agrees that she has acquired sufficient stability to enter its membership.

Our imperial security policy is in a word purely defensive. Neither in it nor in our insular security policy is there any taint of aggressiveness or of acquisitiveness. There seems to me indeed to be a rough parallel between the need which inspires the political side of our security policy overseas and the need which inspires certain aspects of your policy towards the countries of the Caribbean. The scale, of course, is different, because our commitments are so much wider than yours. The Suez Canal, as I was just saying, is the key to our system of imperial communications. It is for us even more important than the Panama Canal is for you, though for the purpose of my argument, let us simply say that each canal is

vital to adequate intercourse between the units of our two commonwealths.

Our solicitude for the inviolability of these two canals has involved the curtailment of the full sovereignty of two weak countries. We withhold from the Egyptians the complete right to self-determination; we keep troops in their country. We treat them in principle rather as you treat the Cubans with your Platt Amendment and your naval base at Guantánamo. We have at one time or another been criticized for certain aspects of our Egyptian policy; you on your side assumed from the Republic of Panama rights over the Isthmus in a way which, if I remember correctly, was criticized by your liberal opinion as being somewhat arbitrary. History will, I am convinced, vindicate our action in regard to Egypt just as fully as it will vindicate your action in regard to Panama.

You traditionally refuse to allow an extra-American power to acquire territory in Latin-America, but I doubt whether, even if the Monroe Doctrine did not exist, you would now allow an extra-American power to abridge the independence of any of the Latin-American republics, within military striking distance of the Panama Canal. We, as I have just told you, try in the same way to guard against the domination of countries like Afghanistan or Persia by ill-disposed or potentially ill-disposed influences.

I am afraid you may think that I have put the cart before the horse in trying to sum up the principles of our foreign policy in my first instead of my last lecture. I have done so because I felt that the various aspects of our diplomacy which I hope to discuss in my other lectures would hang together better if I

prefaced them by an appreciation of the motives and objects which you will find running through them.

Let me recapitulate very briefly. The chief planks of our foreign policy are "peace, security, and trade." We are not acquisitive either territorially or politically. We are not acquisitive if for no other reason than because, like you, we have got all the territory we can manage. We are acquisitive commercially, but not in the bad old sense. We aim not at monopoly but only at a large enough share in the world's markets to support the dense and highly industrialized population of our little island. We do not want to secure exclusive spheres of influence, or special privilege in any part of the world. If we sometimes seem meddlesome it is that we may throw our weight as often as possible upon the side of peace and stability.

If we are insistent upon certain aspects of our security policy, it is because our scattered commonwealth is so extraordinarily dependent upon sea communication and because the population of Great Britain is so utterly dependent upon the outside world for food and trade.

Were our commonwealth as compact and self-contained as yours is, our policy would, I think, be much the same as yours is today, namely, if I may enter the dangerous field of tabloid definitions, comparative isolation, tempered by a series of forays into world affairs in the interest of progress and fair play. Were you in our position, on the other hand, I make bold to think that you would find yourselves doing very much what we are doing.

II

PEACE WITHOUT SECURITY

I HAVE tried to give you some idea of the motives and principles which inspire our foreign policy in these days. I have described how immediately and urgently the well-being of the British Islands has been wrapped up in the recovery of the world from the War and is wrapped up in the peaceful prosperity of other nations. I have made bold to express the hope that I should be able to show you that, by the translation of this necessity into terms of active diplomacy, we are in effect contributing something not altogether negligible to the foundations of a safer civilization.

It must be admitted that for a period after the War we were able to do but little in that direction. It was not that those responsible for our foreign policy were less aware than we are today that a sound and steady liquidation of the War was perhaps more important to Great Britain than to any other country. But statesmanship at that time was often not its own master. It was torn this way and that by passions which, after being distilled by the pressure of the War into the finer forms of patriotism, were transformed, under the relaxation of peace, into its grosser emanations. The Peace Conference, as Count Sforza* told you in his first lecture, was the scene of a struggle between idealism and the more material

* Sforza, Count Carlo: *Diplomacy of Europe since the Versailles Treaty*, Chapter I. Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1928.

impulses of human and political nature. The project of rebuilding the world upon a basis of international coöperation and understanding clashed with instincts of nationalism which were often, unfortunately, not of the highest type. The rancors and distrusting of the War were, as Count Sforza said, prolonged into the peace to a greater degree than after any other conflict in modern times.

Inevitable as this state of affairs was in view of the bitterness aroused by certain aspects of the inception of the War, by certain incidents in its conduct, and by the unprecedented strain which it had imposed upon the endurance and temper of nations, it cannot be entirely ascribed to the workings of popular passion. Statesmanship has to take its share of the blame. Instead of calming passions already bitter enough, it seemed sometimes bent upon stirring them up. Devices to that end, legitimate enough during the actual struggle, were still in use after the armistice. Hopes were encouraged which everybody ought to have known could not be fulfilled. Public opinion, for instance, in all the allied countries was led to expect the payment by Germany of fantastic sums by way of indemnity. You were reminded the other evening how, in that election which we had in England just before the armistice, one minister shouted that he was for hanging the Kaiser, and how another, speaking of Germany, said: "We will get out of her all you can squeeze out of a lemon and a bit more. We will squeeze her until you can hear the pips squeak." The spirit which British statesmanship was then unable to restrain dogged it at the Peace Conference and indeed for several years to come.

Of the Peace Conference I rather hesitate to speak, for Count Sforza has dealt with it with so much more knowledge and authority than I can ever hope to possess. I only attended it for part of the time as a newspaper correspondent. But the first superficial impression which it left upon me is so vivid and unforgettable that I cannot help inflicting it upon you. The atmosphere of Paris in those days was neither pleasant nor reassuring. All the hatreds, distrusting, fears, ambitions, legitimate or illegitimate, all the passions of Europe, many of them the inheritance of centuries of bad neighborhood or uncomfortable government, seemed to have congregated to meet the new doctrine of appeasement and good will which had come from overseas. Things seemed strained, unreal, and rather ominous. The immense amount of solid and painstaking work that was being done was not immediately apparent. What was apparent was that the allied countries of the Old World were terribly tired and overwrought, and were the prey of conflicting currents of emotion, and of all the reactions that come from sudden release from an intolerable strain.

Such seemed to the outsider to be the foreground of the picture. To the delegates in the conference room its background must have been equally disconcerting and equally depressing. The War had, roughly speaking, left Europe divided into three camps: the victors, the vanquished, and Russia. About Russia there was and is very little to be done. But that was not realized at the time of which I am speaking. The eyes of the delegates went often towards the eastern horizon, above which Russia hung like a storm cloud, threatening, aloof, mysterious. She

must have seemed to them to invest the already sufficiently difficult problems of eastern and central Europe with possibilities of new and incalculable complications.

As one traveled westward over the map, the situation was hardly clearer, though, if I may make the distinction, it was more definable, in so far as its main psychological factors were concerned. One discovered everywhere that the vanquished were resentful at what they were going to lose, and that the victors were afraid of losing what they were going to gain. One half of Europe was already angry; the other half was ready to be afraid. There was danger, as one looked ahead, that fear would beget provocation, armament, unfairness, which in their turn would beget fresh hatreds and keep alive the desire for revenge. Everywhere there was economic dislocation. In all directions there were budgets which could not be balanced, and currencies which could not be indefinitely controlled.

In western Europe, it is true, the outward conditions of life were fairly normal, but in central Europe the crust had been broken and anarchy and famine had come to the surface in more places than one.

The task before the Conference was, in fact, one of unparalleled complexity and urgency. If the peace settlement were delayed, huge portions of Europe might fall into economic and political chaos, among which, it was feared, the forces of Bolshevism, then a menace of unplumbed potentialities, might stalk unrestrained. But how, on the other hand, was the conference to deal quickly with the multitudinous problems, great and small, which pressed in upon it?

How was it to weld into an enduring fabric of international relationship all the conflicting emotions and ambitions, all the differences of principle and policy which were unloosed upon Paris after the armistice?

Never has any body of men been called upon to produce a coherent code out of such incoherence and confusion; and for that reason I cannot agree with those who think that the work of the Conference was, on the whole, unsuccessful. When all is said and done, the Conference did, in a few months, give Europe something to catch hold of and did produce something which, in spite of unforeseen difficulties, has gradually developed into the basis of a new public law for the continent.

If you care to study its details in the light of the present state of Europe, you will find that much of the peace settlement has endured and has been justified and that the arrangements which it made and the instruments which it set up have played no unimportant part in the great improvement which has recently come over the affairs of the Old World.

Take, for example, the League of Nations, and consider what it has done and is doing. I do not mean its activity as a center of all sorts of international services, a function which I think everyone is agreed that it is fulfilling admirably. I mean what it has done and is doing in a practical way towards clearing up the loose ends of the peace settlement, towards preventing fresh difficulties, and towards bringing nations together.

To give you even a catalogue of its achievements in that connection would, I am afraid, take too long. I will, therefore, confine myself to two major examples of what I have in mind. By stepping in and

putting Austria and Hungary upon their economic feet, just when the economic outlook was everywhere at its blackest, the League is considered by many authorities in Europe not only to have achieved a work of great intrinsic importance but to have prepared the way indirectly for the Dawes agreement and for all the benefits which that agreement has brought in its train. If that is so, there is really no need to say more to justify its existence and the wisdom of those who contrived it.

I will nevertheless give you my other example. It concerns the political side of European reconstruction. I remember hearing Lord Grey say some time ago that he often felt that war might have been averted in 1914 had the Council of the League of Nations then existed. I imagine that what he meant was that the Council would have given him and other foreign ministers a chance of talking things over face to face before the situation had been hopelessly compromised. There has been happily no crisis of that sort in the years since the signature of the peace settlement and it is devoutly to be hoped that there never will be another. But the opportunity which the League of Nations gives to the statesmen of Europe to talk over the questions of the moment is now continually leaving its impress upon European politics in a way which its founders may not have foreseen, but of which they would certainly have most heartily approved.

Four times a year foreign ministers and others gather in Geneva for the Council meetings of the League and have an opportunity not only of getting to know each other personally but of threshing out privately differences and difficulties which, if treated

through the ordinary diplomatic channels, might easily become contentious. It is not easy, in my opinion, to overestimate the importance of the function which in this way the League fulfills of a sort of unofficial clearing house for political questions. It is probably as much owing to its success in that respect as to any other factor that it is growing to be the symbol and instrument of the new European unity. The coming into force of the Pact of Locarno was, it will be remembered, made conditional upon the entry of Germany into its membership, a fact which is surely not without significance.

But I am wandering from my argument, which was that the treaties of peace are not so bad as they are sometimes painted. It has always, indeed, seemed to me that the confusions of the post-war period were due less to defects in the fabric of the peace settlement than to the fact that the foundations upon which that fabric was constructed were not as sound as they might have been. Very roughly speaking, the underpinning of the European part of the peace settlement was, or ought to have been, the liquidation of the reparation question, the setting up of the League of Nations as an immediate going concern, and some arrangement which would effectively guarantee France from any danger of having to meet single-handed an armed invasion from across the Rhine.

With the reparation question out of the way, Europe would have had a chance of settling down to economic reconstruction. With the League of Nations immediately in effective being, it would have had an instrument to deal with questions some of which the Peace Conference could not hope to work

out in full and others of which it could not foresee; and an international arrangement to guarantee permanent peace on the Rhine would have done a great deal towards securing a basis for comprehensive political reconstruction.

The Conference was well aware of those facts and of those necessities. For the last eight years it has been under a running fire of criticism for its failure to settle the reparation problem, for not naming the lump sum which Germany was to pay. That would of course have been the ideal procedure. But the Conference was not, I must repeat, working under conditions of academic seclusion. It was working under the constant impact of the passions of a half-demented world. Had it set itself to fix the sum which Germany should pay, it would probably have been forced by public opinion in the allied countries to name a figure as grotesque as any of those computations which in those days were constantly being brought forward from one quarter or another. Nor even if unheated reason could have then prevailed, had it any means at its disposal for the scientific fixation of a sum which Germany could economically or equitably be asked to pay. Germany at the time of the Peace Conference was in a state of something approaching economic and political chaos. Nobody knew what was going to happen to her. Nobody had any idea of her assets, present or future.

If the Peace Conference had tried to investigate, it could therefore have reached no useful conclusions. It would only have meant a delay in the general settlement.

Consequently it can, I submit, be fairly argued that it took the most practical course open to it, when,

so far as the main sum was concerned, it created the Reparation Commission to go judicially into the question of Germany's ability to pay and to report upon the subject within a reasonable time.

What went wrong was, in my judgment, that the constitution of the Reparation Commission, like that of the League of Nations and like the even more important scheme for the guaranteeing of the security of the eastern frontier of France, was based upon a fundamental misconception.

Before I explain what I mean by this, I must ask you to allow me to digress and deal with the question of guaranteeing the safety of that eastern frontier of France. I will not apologize for doing so, as few things have bulked larger in European affairs since the War, or have been so frequently misunderstood.

As I said in my first lecture, the War left France in a very different position from that in which it left our two countries. It freed you from the general menace of an aggressive imperialism, inspired by doctrines repugnant to the ideals of the English-speaking races. It freed us from that general menace and also from the more particular menace implied by the German fleet and by the possibility of the control, direct or indirect, of the continental coast opposite our shores by that militant imperialism. The victory of France, on the other hand, was only partial. What France had won by the sword had to be confirmed by treaty, if she was to enjoy the only reward of victory that is really worth having, namely, the freedom to work out for herself a tranquil and secure existence, undisturbed by the specter of future wars.

It was obvious that, though beaten, Germany was

not going to be permanently crippled. Shorn as she was shortly to be of part of her population and of part of her industrial and natural wealth, she would remain more populous than France, with a better birth rate and with the prospect of being in the long run at least as strong industrially. In the last three wars in which they had crossed swords, Germany had overrun France. Unless means could be found to guarantee them from the possibility of a war of revenge, the French people would obviously not feel at ease. And it was equally obvious that unless they were at ease, there could be no real dispensation of permanent and settled security in western Europe or indeed anywhere in Europe.

There were three ways in which the Peace Conference could give France the necessary reassurance. There could be a revision of frontiers which would restore to her all and more than she had lost in 1871, which would, in fact, take the left bank of the Rhine away from Germany and thus make it impossible for Germany to prepare her railways, roads, and bridges as she had done before 1914, for the offensive deployment of her armies almost on foreign soil; or there could be a dissolution of the German Reich; or France could be made secure by a promise of permanent support by all or some of her allies.

The first alternative, that of a revision of the German frontier so that it would end at the Rhine, was energetically brought forward by Marshal Foch at the Conference, though—and this is a fact which is often overlooked—the Marshal never suggested that France should annex the territory between herself and the Rhine. He suggested only that that territory should be detached from Germany. His proposal

was not accepted by the Conference. The German frontier was not made to stop at the Rhine.

The second alternative, the breaking up of Germany, was, for reasons which need no explanation, never considered.

There remained the third course, namely, an arrangement under which the integrity of the eastern frontier of France should be guaranteed by her allies.

The English-speaking powers sought to discover in the League of Nations a means for attaining the permanent tranquillity of Europe, and consequently the permanent security of France and other countries. The League of Nations was, however, an experiment, and France very naturally hesitated to rely on it in a matter which affected her so vitally as her security did. She said in effect to the American and British delegates:

“It is all very well for you Americans and British, in your comfortably isolated positions to be willing to stake everything upon a plan for permanent peace which is still frankly empirical. But for us it is different. We have to face realities which hang constantly over us. Twice in the last fifty years an invading army has suddenly poured across our frontiers. Are you certain that the League of Nations will grow into an authority strong enough to prevent this from happening again? You have refused us our way about the left bank of the Rhine, and we have accepted your refusal. You offer us the League of Nations, and while we do not altogether share your enthusiasm for it, we want to do everything we can for a constructive peace. We will, therefore, come into the League and abide by its terms on one prin-

cial condition. Both the United States and Great Britain must give us a special guarantee of our frontier in case of aggression. If the League turns out to be all that you expect and hope, the guarantee will be unnecessary. If, on the other hand, the League remains of doubtful efficacy, we shall know where we stand."

This argument was, of course, never delivered at the conference table in the words in which I have just given it. But I think it may be taken as representing the general run of French opinion at that time and the general sense of the representations of the French delegate. In any case France was able to impress the Conference with the reasonableness of her position. The stewardship of the League over her eastern frontier was reënforced by the following additional safeguards against the possibility of unprovoked aggression.

First, a treaty of guarantee under which the United States and Great Britain pledged themselves, in the event of wanton aggression on the part of Germany, to come to the assistance of France; secondly, the occupation of the Rhineland by the allies for a certain number of years; thirdly, the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland; fourthly, the assurance that any violation of the provisions of the demilitarization of the Rhineland would be considered as a hostile act against the powers signatory to the Peace Treaty; fifthly, the disarmament of Germany under the supervision first of an inter-allied commission and afterward of the League of Nations.

Of these safeguards, the Anglo-American Guarantee of her eastern frontier was, to France, by far the

most important. Of the others, some were to be temporary, and none, it was fairly clear, even in those days, would keep a great nation permanently in a position of enforced inferiority.

You all know what happened. Your Senate refused to accept either the Franco-American Guarantee Treaty or the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Peace Treaties, and the voters of the United States upheld its decision. The soil, in fact, caved in under the main edifice of the peace settlement. And that brings me back to the point which I was about to make when I broke off to discuss security. The immediate efficacy of the League of Nations, the Reparation Commission, and the guarantee of the French frontier, all depended upon American co-operation. Without the impartial and influential voice of the United States, the League of Nations was bound to lose much of its authority. Without its disinterested American member, the Reparation Commission was bound to lose its judicial impartiality. Without American coöperation the French frontier guarantee was bound to lose half and might lose all its value. Without American participation the whole Peace Treaty would, in fact, lose much of its prestige.

That is what I meant when I said that the peace settlement was founded on a misconception. It was founded upon the assumption that the United States would accept all the European, and, indeed, Asiatic commitments, which were undertaken for it at the Peace Conference.

Please do not think that I am leading up to some stricture of your country for drawing out of the settlement. Far from it. If any hypothetical analogy

is safe, it is that the British people and Parliament would have acted precisely as the American people and Senate did, had the British relationship with Europe been the same as yours.

Nor do I wish it to be thought that I am venturing to criticize President Wilson for having promised that which he was subsequently, and partly through no fault of his own, unable to deliver. In view of the tremendous difficulties with which the Conference was confronted, it goes against the grain to criticize anybody, but looking back at it all, it is difficult to absolve the collective statesmanship of Europe from the charge of a certain carelessness in taking it for granted that the United States, contrary to all its traditions, would be ready to play permanently a leading part in the affairs of the Old World.

We in particular might have known better. Instinct, if nothing else, might have warned us. We ought to have looked back upon our own actions after the Napoleonic War and to have realized that the Atlantic, even in these days, is as broad as the English Channel was a century ago. A hundred years ago we did, it is true, accept a peace settlement which committed us to semi-permanent participation in the affairs of Europe. But our interventions in Europe had been pretty continuous for some time before that and our monarch still had a European kingdom. And even so, it did not take us long to cut loose when we found that the powers were inclined to worship at the shrine of reaction. We might have realized after the armistice that your point of view about Europe was, in spite of your participation in the War, very much what ours was in the days when we still boasted of our "glorious isolation." We might have realized

that you now, as we then, though willing to do our part in a crisis, had no intention of being drawn into the vortex of the European system.

It is surely axiomatic in these days of democratic diplomacy that no foreign policy can, in the long run, or even in the short run, succeed unless it has behind it the warrant of national necessity, and unless public opinion is convinced that it has that warrant. By taking for granted the continued and active American coöperation in the affairs of Europe, we ran contrary to that axiom and paid the price of our mistake.

It remains nevertheless to be seen whether the submission of Europe to President Wilson's leadership in framing the underpinning of the treaty will, in the long run, be accounted altogether unfortunate. Personally I doubt whether it will. I believe that, when the period of reconstruction is over, it will be found that we in the Old World owe a great deal to the policies which the New World brought to the Paris Conference table. I would like, indeed, humbly to associate myself with that eloquent tribute which Count Sforza paid to the struggle which President Wilson waged at that table against the forces of reaction. The Dawes settlement which solved the reparation problem on an equitable basis and the Pact of Locarno, which has done so much to restore the political equilibrium of Europe, are both measures which go far to vindicate President Wilson's judgment of what was necessary for Europe. Who knows, moreover, what the League of Nations would have amounted to today, had not President Wilson's pertinacity at Paris given it the impetus necessary to carry it through the difficult years of its infancy?

Who knows indeed whether without his vision there would today be a League at all?

There is, I fear, another reason, besides our inability at the time of the Peace Conference to appraise what appears to have been the popular American point of view, why we British must take our share of the blame for the collapse of the foundations of the peace settlement. Many of the tribulations which overtook the continent between 1920 and 1923 might have been avoided, had we come forward, as we could have done, directly the American Senate refused to accept the French Guarantee Treaty, and had offered to continue the guarantee single-handed. We did not do so. We took advantage of a clause in the British treaty which enabled us to cancel it, if the American treaty failed of ratification. That was in March, 1920. Nearly two years were to elapse before the project of a security treaty between England and France was again raised officially, and then it was raised upon French and not upon British initiative. It was raised by M. Briand after his return from the Washington Conference in December, 1921.

It has been stated that we did offer to continue the guarantee single-handed when you dropped out. That is not, I am afraid, quite accurate historically. M. Briand's suggestions in 1921 were indeed preceded by certain unofficial soundings on our part regarding the resuscitation of the guarantee treaty. But those soundings came too late. Thrown back upon her own resources, France had already launched out into a security policy of her own, which made it impossible for her to accept the original treaty.

Seriously alarmed at the abandonment by her two most powerful allies of a project which she felt was of vital importance to her future, France did what any other practical nation would have done in like circumstances, and tried to make the best of the material which she still had at hand. The new diplomacy having failed her, she went back to the old diplomacy. She began to think once more in the old terms of the balance of military power. Germany was to her a potential enemy; Germany therefore had to be kept down and surrounded.

She called in the new states of eastern Europe to take the place of her old western allies. The Franco-Polish treaty was signed in February, 1921. Poland was linked up with the Little Entente by a treaty with Rumania in March of the same year. In June the finishing touches were given to the Little Entente which consisted of Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Rumania; and the new states east of Germany were thus welded into a compact block united to each other and connected with France by an intricate system of alliances, loans, and military missions.

This was the principal reason why a security pact which would have been deemed adequate by France in 1919, no longer suited her in 1921. In 1921 France required that the guarantee of her eastern frontier should be extended to include the western frontier of Poland. Loyalty to her new ally could make her demand no less.

But the British Government on its side could not consent to the inclusion of the Polish frontier in a security treaty. It knew that public opinion in the United Kingdom, no less than in the Dominions, would refuse to support any such extension of our

commitments, for the same reasons that American public opinion had refused to sanction the European commitments which President Wilson wanted to make for the United States. It was recognized in the British Islands that with the stability of western Europe British interests were inextricably involved; but in spite of the fact that the spark which had started the Great War had come out of the center of the continent, it was not realized that, in the last analysis, political Europe is one and indivisible, and that an armed infraction of the Polish frontier would lead logically and almost inevitably to war on the Rhine and would thus implicate western Europe. This lack of appreciation of realities on the part of the British public not only brought to nothing M. Briand's suggestion for another security pact, but, as I shall have occasion to show you in my next lecture, immensely increased the difficulties of the long negotiations which lead up to the Pact of Locarno.

Another deadlock began to arise about the same time between France and us over reparation. In the period immediately after the peace settlement we were, as Doctor Reinhold indicated to you last night, associated with France in demands upon Germany which, one now sees, were excessive. But, as time went on and as it became steadily more apparent that there could be no stability in Europe so long as reparation remained an open sore, our policy became more and more one of moderation. The difference between the national outlooks and the national requirements of France and ourselves were in fact accentuated. France needed all the money she could get to set her finances in order and to rebuild her devastated districts. She was, therefore, inclined in

any case to ask from Germany the highest possible sums. That tendency was enhanced by our failure to do something for her security. If Germany was crippled by the payment of the sums needed by the exchequer at Paris, why so much the better. Her ability for a war of revenge would be by that much impaired and postponed. Security and reparation, a political and economic problem, thus got involved. France was forever making upon Germany demands which had the justification of equity and law, but not of economic expediency. Germany, on her side, gave an impression of stubbornness. One was always being told in London in those days of what the late Herr Stinnes or some other German industrial magnate had said in private about the determination of his country not to pay reparation.

We, in England, gradually became seriously alarmed, and our liberal press and politicians, to say nothing of the organs and spokesmen of the Labor party, and even some conservative newspapers and public men, broke out into criticism of France. Our business and financial world was more discreet but equally worried. It felt that French policy was putting back indefinitely the reconstruction of Europe, so vital for British trade and for the alleviation of unemployment. It saw also that French policy would defeat its own ends, so far as reparation went; that it was impossible to continue to knock Germany about so that she might become impotent for a war of revenge and at the same time to get reparation out of her.

Great Britain and France seemed to be drifting apart. Both countries, or rather the vocal parts of public opinion in both countries, were in the wrong

as I imagine most Frenchmen and Englishmen would now admit. The French were wrong in thinking that any policy which they could pursue would succeed in keeping Germany permanently in subjection or that a war indemnity can be paid by any but a prosperous country. We were wrong out of excess of insularity, if I may so put it. We seemed temporarily to have lost that faculty which is so important an ingredient of successful diplomacy of seeing things from the point of view of the other side. We did not make sufficient allowance for the difference in the respective positions of the two countries. So at sea was our public opinion about the true significance of French policy that it was in those years quite common for newspapers and for politicians to inveigh against French militarism. It was not realized that the large military establishment which France was keeping up and the military alliances which she had formed were the product of nervousness and not at all of a desire to dominate. Nor was it properly grasped that if France was nervous, that if she felt constrained to deal with Germany in her own way, it was because she felt that she had been left in the lurch by her English-speaking allies. That lack of perception made even our official attitude towards France at times rather unsympathetic. Instead of going to her quietly and saying, "We quite understand your point of view, we recognize to the full your right to security, we are as anxious to get all the reparation we can as you are, but are your methods really the best in the circumstances," instead of taking a sympathetic and conciliatory line, we were in those days rather inclined to lecture aloofly and to obstruct; and all in vain, for France, whatever her apprehensions

about the future might be, held the whip hand in Europe for the time being and could do what she liked with Germany.

The culmination of the independent French reparation policy was, of course, the occupation of the Ruhr by France and Belgium. The invasion of the Ruhr had been threatened for a long time and had always been opposed by the British Government on the ground that it was illegal and would be useless. We maintained that there was no sanction for it in the Peace Treaty and in its later stages we were forced to protest on the ground that it interfered with the free navigation of the Rhine which under the treaty is opened to all nations. Foreign goods were held up in custom houses in the cities on the river and so on. The occupation also was undertaken in the teeth of strong opposition on the part of the British member of the Reparation Commission, on the strength of a trivial default by Germany in the payment of reparation in kind. It may even have been, as more than one serious commentator has asserted, an unacknowledged renewal of the War between France and Belgium on the one hand and Germany on the other.

It was not, moreover, successful from the material point of view. The French and Belgians stayed in the Ruhr for more than a year. Neither for them nor for the Germans was it a pleasant year. The German industrialists were hit at their nerve center and as Doctor Reinhold has told you, the whole German Reich was shaken by the impact of the invasion. In the Ruhr itself the occupation was the cause of much suffering and misery. The French and Belgians on their side found that the exploitation of the re-

sources of the Ruhr and the management of its complicated railway system, in the teeth of the opposition of a hostile and sullen population, was attended by difficulties so serious as to put out of the question the collection of any really important sum on account of reparation.

But even if it failed intrinsically, even if it was illegal, even if as many observers on both sides of the Atlantic felt it was ethically indefensible, it would be rash to take it for granted that the Ruhr venture will be written off by the dispassionate historian as a useless blunder. Desperate cases sometimes require desperate remedies, and nothing could have been more desperate than the deadlock into which Franco-German relations had fallen by the end of 1922. I cannot help feeling that as the events of those bad years, with which I have been dealing in this lecture, fall into perspective, it will be recognized that the Ruhr did on the whole have a salutary effect.

It showed the German industrialists that the French could hurt them. It showed the German people that the French meant business and had the upper hand, and hence made it easier for the German Government to carry through its very considerable share in the ensuing process of constructive conciliation. To the French people it revealed two truths which seemed for a time to have been hidden from them. It showed that force would not extract from Germany the money they wanted. It showed that the vitality and cohesiveness of German nationality were too strong to be cowed and broken by outside interference. Both facts were demonstrated by what happened in the Ruhr; but an even more striking ex-

ample of the impossibility of destroying the political and spiritual unity of the German Reich was afforded by the complete failure of the Separatist movement which towards the end of the period was encouraged by certain French officials further south on the left bank of the Rhine in the hopes of forming an independent buffer state.

To Great Britain the Ruhr venture gave a chance of stepping in between weary and disillusioned combatants and of playing a not inconsiderable part in bringing to a satisfactory settlement first the economic problem of which reparation was key, and then the political problem of which the security of the Rhineland frontiers was the key. With that process and with the part which, as Doctor Reinhold has reminded you, the United States played in its earlier stages, I shall deal in my next lecture.

THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE

I CONCLUDED my previous lecture by saying that the Ruhr episode gave to Great Britain an opportunity of intervening in Europe more effectively than she had been able to do since the armistice. It did so because it resolved various of the complexes which had been vexing the continent, and thus brought about a new and fluid situation.

In France it made people wonder whether a policy of force against Germany was really going to pay, whether it was really calculated to produce either money in the immediate future or security in the distant future. The question began to be asked whether France, instead of playing a lone hand before a critical world, might not do better to try to solve the reparation question by negotiation in conjunction with the other interested powers and to see whether it might not after all be possible to live on good terms with Germany. One of the results of this was the defeat, in the general election of the spring of 1924, of the government which had been responsible for the Ruhr, and the election to office of politicians who had opposed that venture.

On the other side of the Rhine the German people were learning by bitter experience that the stiff-necked methods of the nationalists and some of the industrialists might indeed deprive the allies of reparation, but only at the price of the progressive ruin of their country. Might it not be better, they were beginning to ask themselves, for their govern-

ment to try to make a working arrangement with their ex-enemies and thus to give Germany once more the place which was due to her in Europe?

Belgium, which like Great Britain is intensively industrialized and hence depends upon her export market in Europe, was alarmed at the damage that the Ruhr was doing her trade, and like France was disillusioned by the meagerness of the actual returns which were coming in from the occupied territory.

Italy was suffering from difficulty in getting her coal from the Ruhr, and from the general economic dislocation to the north of her. All over Europe the paralysis of Germany was causing discomfort and apprehension, and from many quarters came signs of a growing desire to be finished, once and for all, with the rancors of the War, to convert the peace settlement from an imposed peace into an agreed peace, to insure security not by the armed balance of power, but by common arrangements for the common good, to return, in fact, to a practical search for those ideals which were so much in the air at the time of the armistice, but had since been engulfed in the confusions of a peace which was as yet no real peace.

Never perhaps had there been such a chance for British statesmanship. It was obvious that the essential preliminary to any era of constructive good will lay in the settlement of the reparation and security problems upon a basis of Franco-German reconciliation, and that in this process it would be almost equally essential for Great Britain to play the part of an honest but not disinterested broker.

By the autumn of 1923 it was already clear that the Ruhr occupation was going to disappoint French

expectations. At about the same time the German Government abandoned the encouragement it had been giving to the passive resistance of the population of the Ruhr to the Franco-Belgian authorities, an act which made it easier for the French Government to compromise, should it see fit to do so.

In London, you will remember, there was, at the end of 1923, a change of government. The Conservatives, under Mr. Baldwin, fell and were succeeded by the Labor party under Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. During the last months of his premiership, Mr. Baldwin began to prepare for another attempt to settle the reparation problem by negotiation. As this process would obviously involve the scaling down of German payments to a level unpalatable to both the French and British publics, he decided that the first thing to do was to get a new estimate of Germany's capacity to pay, either from a conference of the interested parties, or from a commission of experts.

He therefore addressed, in October, 1923, a note to the American Government, asking whether it would send representatives to a conference, or alternatively, to a commission of investigation. His note was not, as a matter of fact, spontaneous. It was inspired by gestures made nearly a year earlier by President Coolidge and Mr. Hughes. Mr. Hughes, as Doctor Reinhold has already told you, had pointed out in his speech at New Haven in December, 1922, that economic conditions in Europe were more than a European problem, that they were, in point of fact, a world problem in which the United States was concerned, and had suggested the possibility of the summoning by the governments of Europe of an expert commission to express an opinion on the

amount of reparation payment to be made, and to suggest a plan for effecting those payments. Mr. Hughes expressed confidence that competent Americans could be found to serve on such a commission.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Hughes' reply to Mr. Baldwin's note was sympathetic. He promised America's participation in a reparation conference, on certain conditions, and repeated his conviction that, should it be decided to appoint a commission of experts rather than to summon a conference, American citizens would be found to serve upon it.

The expert commission idea was, as you know, finally adopted, but not until Mr. Hughes had once more thrown the weight of his country into the scales of common sense. We wanted the commission to be empowered to report on Germany's ultimate capacity to pay, for it seemed to us that the reparation problem could only be solved by the formulation of a schedule of payments stretching over many years. The French Government, on the other hand, desired that the commission should be authorized to report only upon Germany's present capacity to pay. Eventually the French Government gave way, but not until Mr. Hughes had announced that if the work of the commission was to be curtailed as it suggested, his government would not authorize American participation.

Such was the genesis of the famous Dawes Commission which, under its American chairman, produced the report that in turn enabled the London Reparation Conference of the summer of 1924 to secure what, it is to be hoped, will prove to be a final settlement of the question of German payments on

account of the War. Such, too, was the result of the first move taken by the British Government in what was shortly to develop into a continuous attack upon those spirits of unrest and unreason which were still loose in Europe.

For initiation of that attack, a Conservative government had been responsible. It was left to a Labor government to carry it on. There was much speculation when Mr. Ramsay MacDonald entered office, as to what his policy would be. The Labor party had been very critical of the Ruhr occupation. It had bitterly attacked what it called French militarism, and some of its spokesmen had gone so far as to advocate isolation as the best policy that Great Britain could follow until Europe settled down. How would it translate into national policy when in office the views which it had expressed when in opposition?

The country did not have to wait long to know. In January, 1924, Mr. MacDonald addressed to M. Poincaré a personal letter in which he expressed regret at the number of unsettled questions outstanding between France and Great Britain, and at the same time registered his confidence that those questions could be settled by "the strenuous action of good will" in a spirit of frankness without hostility. To this letter M. Poincaré replied in gracious terms. A month later, Mr. MacDonald wrote to M. Poincaré again. He began his letter with a review of British public opinion towards France. I will give you his exact words:

"It is," he wrote, "widely felt in England that, contrary to the provision of the Treaty of Versailles, France is endeavoring to create a situation which gains for it what it failed to get during the allied

peace negotiations. . . . The people of this country regard with anxiety what appears to them to be the determination of France to ruin Germany and to dominate the continent without consideration of our reasonable interests and of future consequences to European settlement."

After referring to the apprehension caused in England by "the large military and aerial establishments maintained not only in eastern but also in western France," and to the contrast between the funded debt of Great Britain to the United States and the unfunded debt of France to Great Britain, Mr. MacDonald tackled the questions of security and reparation. He described the widespread suffering in Great Britain due to economic dislocation, to that "invisible devastation" as he called it, which in Great Britain took the place of the devastated areas of northern France, and drew the following conclusions:

Our devastated areas may be more difficult to visualize and define. Their reconstruction may be less tangible and will be more protracted; but they exist for us as cruelly as they exist for France, and so long as no remedy is found, the present sufferings and anxieties of the Empire must continue. Before we can discuss this problem, however, we must clearly await the reports of the two expert committees (that is to say, of the two Dawes committees) and I do so with the hope that they will draw your country and mine together. I see no reason why this problem, if approached in its widest aspect, if considered in conjunction with the cognate problem of interallied debts, should not at an early date be solved in such a manner as to give to England the hope of economic stabilization in Europe, and to France the assurance that her just requirements will be met.

I make no apology for giving you this letter at some length. It will, surely, go down to history as a state paper of the first interest. Mr. MacDonald broke new ground boldly, by addressing the chief living exponent of the old diplomacy in a style that departed so radically from the traditional usages of international intercourse. His boldness was rewarded by a courteous and conciliatory reply from M. Poincaré.

Thus it was that Mr. MacDonald inaugurated what may perhaps be called the new diplomacy of personal friendship and close and informal contact to which, to no small extent, he owed, and his successor, Sir Austen Chamberlain, owes, such authority as the one had and the other has in European affairs. The same spirit of friendly conciliation which informed his letter to M. Poincaré marked Mr. MacDonald's handling of the extremely difficult and important reparation conference, usually known as the Dawes Conference of the succeeding summer, and of the equally difficult negotiations which led up to it, no less than it did Sir Austen Chamberlain's success as chairman, first among equals, of the Locarno Conference a year later.

Everyone has heard of the motor yacht expedition upon Lake Maggiore during that conference, in the course of which, secluded from untoward interruptions and coaxed to sweet reasonableness by the golden beauty of their surroundings, the chief figures in that notable meeting conjured away difficulties which, in the more prosaic atmosphere of the council hall might have confounded their labors.

There was an incident at the Dawes Conference which, if less well known, shows equally well the im-

portance that Mr. MacDonald, like his successor, attached to the human touch. Germany, you will recall, came to that conference only after her ex-enemies had determined upon the main lines upon which they suggested that the Dawes scheme should be converted into an international agreement. The conference was held in the Foreign Secretary's room at the Foreign Office. Mr. MacDonald, as President, sat at the end of the room remote from the door. Places for the German delegates had been arranged at the other end of the table, near the door. The German delegates entered in rather a strained, expectant atmosphere, and were about to take their seats when the Prime Minister turned to a secretary behind him, and sent him hurriedly over to bring the leaders of the German delegation to his end of the table. He shook hands with them and presented them to M. Herriot and some of his other colleagues. A few minutes of smiling conversation removed the tension; and the German delegation returned to their seats to take part in the first conference of ex-allies and ex-enemies over which the memories of the War could cast no shadow.

Mr. MacDonald was, of course, lucky in the circumstances which attended the Dawes negotiations. Though M. Poincaré had responded to his overtures with the politeness and statesmanship which one would expect from one of the greatest and most successful figures in contemporary European politics, it may be doubted whether the leader of the British Labor party could ever have established really intimate relations with the leader of the French Conservatives. But before Mr. MacDonald had been many months in office, M. Poincaré fell, and was suc-

ceeded by M. Herriot. Mr. MacDonald was thus called upon to deal with a fellow Socialist with whose mind and methods he had long been familiar.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, as I said just now, has carried on and developed Mr. MacDonald's methods of personal and friendly diplomacy. He has done so especially in connection with League of Nations meetings. Since he became Foreign Minister, he has not missed a single meeting of the Assembly which is convened once a year in September, or of the Council which comes together at least four times a year. The Foreign Ministers of the other countries have tended to become equally assiduous. The result is that, as I pointed out to you the other evening, Geneva has become a sort of club of foreign ministers, a place where they can meet and quietly discuss the most controversial problems without being forced to satisfy almost from hour to hour the inconvenient curiosity of a waiting continent.

These private goings and comings at Geneva are, I know, frowned upon by some supporters of the League on the ground that they make for what is called secret diplomacy. To this criticism, my answer is a simple and I venture to think a practical one.

International negotiations to succeed must be secret up to a point. When in private life a contentious question has to be hammered out between two or more individuals, those individuals, if they are wise, do not take the whole world into their confidence and have a public debate in the newspapers or in the law courts. They get together in private or their representatives do, and try to settle things quietly and informally. Diplomats charged with questions in which national *amour propre* is often

involved and perhaps other less creditable passions cannot in the same way afford to do all their work under the gaze of the public. It is easier to be frank, and, what is still more important, it is easier to make concessions and to meet the other side halfway in private than it is in open conference when controversy and concession are flashed to the press of the countries concerned, and sometimes, it is to be feared, distorted.

I am not suggesting that there should ever be secret agreements. Secret agreements are quite another thing, and nothing can be said in favor of them. One likes indeed to think that the world is definitely quit of them. We anyhow have none of them upon our conscience, nor I am sure have you; and there is no reason to suppose that any European countries have. But if we want to get anywhere with our foreign relations, I am afraid that in this imperfect world it will for a long time be necessary for much of the spade work of diplomacy to continue to be done, if I may mix my metaphors, in the wings of the theatre and not upon the open stage.

I must not, however, wander like this from my subject. Mr. MacDonald, as I have shown, demonstrated early in his career as premier and foreign minister that in order to settle the reparation problem he meant to take every advantage of the disillusionment which was growing in France over the Ruhr. Nor had he long been in office before it became clear that he regarded the settlement of reparation as only the first item in a wider program.

The first time that I heard Mr. MacDonald unfold his ideas in public on this subject was to a group of journalists who had come to him to seek guidance as

to the foreign policy of the Labor party. The Prime Minister started by pointing out that alike for selfish and altruistic reasons it was one of the first duties of any British Government to work for the settlement of Europe. That settlement, he said, would have to come in stages. It was too big an undertaking for all its different aspects to be tackled together. The reparation problem would have to be got out of the way first because the foundation of civilization in Europe was economic, and because in Germany especially that foundation was rapidly going to bits.

When it had been settled what Germany could pay the allies, then the political side of reconstruction would have to be attacked. The first thing in that direction was to give France and other countries the feeling of security to which they were entitled. After that it would be necessary to arrange for Germany's entry into the League of Nations. Then with war-time divisions obliterated and its more pressing problems out of the way, Europe could attack disarmament and other reforms in the necessary atmosphere of general tranquillity. Mr. MacDonald also made it clear that he meant in the not very distant future to see whether it might not be possible to have better relations with Russia, not because he had any delusions about the Bolsheviks but in order to do what he could for trade and unemployment.

The foregoing is from memory, but I think it gives a fairly accurate picture of the essentials of Mr. MacDonald's foreign program as he had thought it out at the time when he entered office. The success of the Dawes Commission and of the conference which followed, left him free to turn to the political side of that program. The task which this involved was

even more difficult than the settlement of reparation. Over reparation Mr. MacDonald had had public opinion in England solidly behind him. Much as we disliked paring down German payments, we realized that their reduction was economically necessary and that it was the price which we had to pay for the resuscitation of our much-needed European trade. But as I have already had occasion to point out, our democracy was less clear-sighted about European security. It was willing to guarantee the frontiers of France because it realized that British interests were bound up in the tranquillity of western Europe, but it refused to admit that there was anything in the French contention that it was equally necessary for the peace of Europe, western as much as eastern, that there should be no upsetting by force of those frontiers beyond Germany about which Count Sforza told us last week. Its opinion on this point was so definite that it was obviously no use arguing with it. It had to be accepted as a fixed point in the evolution of our foreign policy. To disregard it would have been for a British Government to court the political fate of President Wilson.

Seldom, consequently, have foreign ministers been confronted by a dilemma more difficult than that which during the year following the Dawes settlement taxed the ingenuity first of Mr. MacDonald and then of Sir Austen Chamberlain. They had either to disappoint France, to whom we were pledged by every consideration of honor and friendship, and to risk throwing Europe back into a state of confusion and uncertainty, or they had to find some way of guaranteeing the Polish frontier without increasing British responsibility in the matter.

The dilemma proved too much for Mr. MacDonald to solve during the brief time he remained in office. Shortly before he fell, he went to Geneva and helped to evolve the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The central idea of the Protocol was to provide exhaustive machinery for the settlement of all disputes, and to improve the machinery set up by the Covenant of the League of Nations for the taking of sanctions against a country that broke the peace. The innovations it contained did not satisfy British opinion either at home or overseas.

Some of the dominions feared that its provisions regarding arbitration might limit their sovereignty in the matter of oriental immigration. All the dominions felt that it involved an unnecessary increase of British commitments in Europe. On the latter score the Protocol was opposed equally vigorously at home. It was felt that it would make us, in common with its other signatories, a sort of promiscuous policeman of Europe, that it would in fact render us the guarantors of the western frontier of Poland just as much as of the eastern frontier of France.

The Conservative party which came back into office again when Labor went out late in 1924 was consequently constrained to repudiate the work of its predecessors. The duty of doing so fell upon Sir Austen Chamberlain at the first Council of the League of Nations which he attended in March, 1925. It was not a pleasant duty. France, which had played a large part in its formulation, had pinned her faith upon the Protocol. Other continental countries were inclined to think well of it. There were murmurings at Geneva that Great Britain was selfishly putting

herself against the wishes of Europe, and it was apparent that unless we produced an effective substitute for the Protocol, we should be in danger of losing the authority in the councils of Europe which Mr. MacDonald had won back for us by his success with the Dawes Conference.

It was also urgently necessary to get on with the work of which that conference had been the first stage. There were signs that the spirit of reconciliation which it had initiated was becoming less strong than it had been. It had generally been taken for granted that as a result of the improvement in the relations between the allies and Germany which followed the adoption of the Dawes Plan, the evacuation would shortly take place of the first of the occupied areas on the Rhine which the allies under the treaty had promised to relinquish in 1925 provided that Germany was then carrying out the terms of the treaty. It was becoming apparent that France would like to hold up this evacuation not only until Germany had liquidated certain outstanding treaty obligations but until the Protocol or some similar arrangement gave her the security to which she felt entitled. Things like that, together with a controversy which Germany had perhaps rather gratuitously raised by suggesting that she would only enter the League of Nations if she were absolved from responsibility for the War, all showed how easily the delicate plant which was springing from the seed of the Dawes Conference might be blighted, if Great Britain failed within a reasonable time to reassure Europe as to her ability to produce something as good as the Protocol.

It was Germany who gave the first indication of

a way out. Some weeks before Sir Austen Chamberlain rejected the Protocol, she came forward with a suggestion for a general pact between her and her former enemies for the maintenance of the *status quo* of her western frontier, a pact which might also be reënforced by arbitration treaties between Germany and the countries concerned. Nothing was said about the Polish frontier, but there was a hint that there, also, something of the same sort might be achieved. The hint took the form of a suggestion that Germany was prepared to conclude similar arbitration treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of juridical and political disputes with other countries as well. In his speech at Geneva rejecting the Protocol, Sir Austen Chamberlain developed Germany's idea by suggesting as the best alternative to the Protocol, the supplementing of the Covenant of the League of Nations by special arrangements to meet special needs, such as, of course, the frontier problems to the east and west of Germany. These arrangements, he continued, should be purely defensive, and should be made to work in with the League of Nations. Such was the germ of the famous Pact of Locarno.

There is unfortunately no time to trace the negotiations leading up to the conference which produced this pact, or to describe the conference itself. All that I will say is that never in the course of history has so informal a conference had such important results. It was a triumph of the informality of the new diplomacy over the formality of the old diplomacy. For this triumph the public opinion of the world has generously given Sir Austen Chamberlain the lion's share of the credit, but his tact and persistence

would have availed nothing, had it not been for the determination, loyalty, and breadth of view with which his colleagues from Paris, Berlin, and the other interested capitals of Europe seconded his efforts.

The Pact of Locarno consisted of five treaties and of an annex in which the allies gave Germany certain assurances about the working of Article 16 of the League Covenant. The most important treaty is that which binds us and Italy to defend France should we consider that she has been wantonly attacked by Germany, and to defend Germany should we consider that she has been wantonly attacked by France. The other four treaties were arbitration treaties between Germany on the one hand and France, Belgium, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia on the other hand.

France simultaneously concluded with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia respectively identical treaties whereby each of the contracting parties binds itself to go to the aid of the other in the event of an attack by Germany, without, if necessary, waiting for the Council of the League of Nations to sanction such action.

This complex of treaties came about as near as anything ever does in politics to satisfying everybody. Great Britain, it is true, stood out from the guarantee of the frontiers to the east of Germany, but there were adequate compensations for her abstention. Germany, by her arbitration treaties with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, had definitely renounced the use of force for the rectification of the frontiers between her and those two countries. Also she was, under the pact, bound to come into the

League of Nations. The pact, indeed, was not to become operative until she did so.

There was moreover a feeling that in all probability the pact would never have to be invoked. Should it become necessary to invoke it, it would, indeed, mean that it had failed in its chief object. Its value was and is, when all is said and done, chiefly psychological. By suddenly and dramatically fulfilling hopes too long deferred, the Pact of Locarno gave Europe a much-needed sedative. It revealed the old enemies of the War working together to harmonize with the common good their legitimate national interests.

By making the way clear for Germany's entry into the League of Nations, it officially closed the cleavages of the War. By promising her a seat on the Council of the League, the ex-allies formally welcomed Germany back to the place to which she is entitled in what used to be called the concert of Europe.

There have, of course, been setbacks since. Germany's actual entry into the League was delayed unduly by unexpected difficulties in arranging for her inclusion in the Council of the League, difficulties caused, it should be noted, by the *amour propre* of other nations and not by any reluctance on the part of anyone to give her her place. There has also been popular disappointment in Germany that, though reduced in scope, as provided for in the treaty, the occupation of the Rhineland by allied troops should still continue. The slowness with which Europe is moving towards land disarmament, judging from the speeches of some of her public men and by articles in her press has been another cause of

disappointment in that country, for the clauses of the Peace Treaty dealing with German disarmament are, it will be remembered, prefaced by a statement that Germany undertakes the obligations contained in those clauses in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations.

On the French side, the popular agitation in Germany for the evacuation of the occupied area and the slowness with which Germany has seemed at times during the previous year to be carrying out the last stages of her disarmament program has occasionally provoked expressions of suspicion about the policy of Berlin. On both sides of the Rhine there have also, from time to time, been speeches not perhaps quite in harmony with the spirit of Locarno.

But it was not to be expected that the wounds of the War, even though healed, should cease at once and altogether from giving occasional twinges or that habits of thought acquired during the bad years after the armistice should be completely obliterated overnight.

One must cast one's mind back four or five years and compare the condition of Europe then with what it is today, to get things in the right perspective. What a contrast that scrutiny reveals. Four years ago France had just gone into the Ruhr. Germany was in chaos. Her currency was rushing towards perdition. In France also the public finances were slowly slipping from bad to worse.

In other parts of Europe, there were still almost unlimited possibilities of economic catastrophe and considerable possibilities of political trouble. Nearly everywhere the psychology of the War still obtained.

Today that psychology has virtually vanished. Germany is making what there is every reason to hope is a permanent economic recovery. France is recapturing her financial equilibrium.

Italy has regained much of her material prosperity. Further east, the League of Nations has set Austria and Hungary upon their feet. Everywhere political and economic reconstruction appear to be making progress. Europe proper in fact is beginning to find herself so solidly on her feet that even the vagaries of Moscow have for the moment almost ceased to worry the majority of her governments, irritating as they are to the commercial communities of those countries which want to trade with Russia.

I said to you the other night that the best way of ending the danger of more war lay, surely, in the development of the community spirit among nations, in the realization of the fact that the prosperity of each individual nation is bound up in the prosperity of its neighbors. The signature of the Pact of Locarno at the end of 1925 was the occasion of speeches by the leading statesmen of the countries concerned. All spoke of the new era of reconciliation, of the hope that was dawning for Europe that at last a practical and solid foundation for the peace settlement had been found. But into some of the speeches there crept a less obvious note, a note which one hopes will turn out to have been prophetic.

"In the light of these treaties," said M. Briand, "we are Europeans only. . . . If they are not the draft of a constitution of a European family within the orbit of the League of Nations, they would be frail indeed."

Herr Stresemann, in his turn, said: "Each of us

must first be a citizen of his own country, a good Frenchman, a good Englishman, a good German, as a member of his own nation. But each one also must be a citizen of Europe, linked together in the great conception of civilization which imbues our continent. We have a right to speak of a European idea. . . .”

Uttered by the representatives of France and Germany in the great reception room of the Foreign Office in London less than two years after the worst bitterness of the Ruhr, those were indeed encouraging and inspiring words to us who heard them, and we were not without pride to think that they were elicited by an achievement in which it was proclaimed in all countries that British diplomacy had played no inconsiderable part.

IV

BRITISH POLICY IN CHINA. THE RISE OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

I PROPOSE in this lecture to take up the Chinese problem, or rather the British treatment of it, a treatment which may at times have struck you as being rather illogical.

For the past two years and more, we have been the special target of that sometimes uncomfortably active hatred of foreigners which has been such a marked characteristic of the nationalist movement in China. Our imperialism, our selfishness, our duplicity, have been the text of countless speeches and manifestoes. Our trade has been boycotted for a time disastrously in Canton, and energetically elsewhere. Our ships have been sniped and attacked. Our concessions have been rushed by mobs. Our nationals have been molested and insulted.

We on our side have sent to Chinese shores larger armed forces than any other nation maintains there, an action which has been greeted by the Chinese extremists and their Russian allies as yet another example of British militarism and imperialism.

At the same time, we have gone further than other nations in offering to meet the demands of those who have been attacking us. Indeed, we have actually tried to meet some of them. We have broken new ground by making concessions to the Chinese, and advising the other powers to do the same, without insisting upon the condition that China shall first set up a stable government, a condition which has

hitherto rendered all such offers virtually valueless. I hope to describe to you what we have done in that direction in another lecture. At present I am merely going to try to expose some of the reasons for our taking independent action; but it will, perhaps, make things clearer—or I should say a little less obscure, as clear is not an epithet which can ever be applied to any facet of the Chinese problem—it will perhaps make things less obscure if, even at the risk of repetition, I preface what I have to say by an effort to reduce that problem and our prescription for it to a few sentences.

The agitation in China against us and other foreigners is, as I have said, part and parcel of the nationalist movement. The chief item in the foreign policy of that movement is the abolition of the unequal intercourse which at present exists between the Chinese and the foreigner within his gates. The foreigner, as you all know, lives in a little world of his own in China. He has his own law courts. He governs his own concessions. He is immune from Chinese taxation. He insists upon the Chinese levying tariff duties which have been devised not entirely perhaps from the point of view of the Chinese themselves. Even when he travels or resides in remote parts of China, he carries about with him certain privileges attached to his person. His special position comes to him from the one-sided treaties which the western powers imposed upon China by force when they broke through the barriers of her exclusiveness about the middle of the last century.

At the Washington Conference nearly six years ago, the powers, which have treaty rights in China, formally undertook to do various things to modify

this unequal relationship. Their promises have never materialized, largely, but not entirely, because the central government in China has collapsed. Thus one finds Mr. Kellogg, your Secretary of State, in a statement issued last January saying: "The government of the United States . . . is ready now to continue the negotiations on the entire subject of the tariff and extraterritoriality or to take up negotiations on behalf of the United States alone. The only question is with whom we should negotiate. As I have said heretofore, if China can agree upon the appointment of delegates representing the authorities or the people of the country, we are prepared to negotiate such a treaty. However, existing treaties, which were ratified by the Senate of the United States, cannot be abrogated by the President but must be superseded by treaties negotiated with somebody representing China and subsequently ratified by the Senate of the United States."

Until recently that was our policy, too. We were waiting for a central government with whom we could negotiate. But as time went on and as it became more and more obvious that it might be at least years before China again acquired an effective central government, and as the nationalist movement gained strength, and as the agitation against the one-sided treaties grew and grew, it began to be felt in London that nothing much could be lost and that something might be gained, certainly morally and perhaps materially, by a gesture on the part of the treaty powers which would prove to the nationalists—and by the nationalists I mean something more than the Southern Government and the followers—that we really meant business at the Washington

Conference, that we were not, as the Chinese extremists and their Bolshevik friends were always proclaiming, simply using the impotence of the Peking Government and the general chaos of China as a pretext for delaying concessions which we had never really meant to grant.

The British Government therefore suggested to the treaty powers last December that we should all combine in a declaration which would not only reaffirm our determination to carry out the Washington promises as soon as there was a responsible Chinese Government to deal with, but would also make to the Chinese certain concessions which could be put into force at once.

Not for the first time in history, the treaty powers found themselves unable to combine upon a common policy and it became apparent that our suggestions for joint action were going to end in smoke. We then decided, in the words of Mr. Kellogg, to take up negotiations on behalf of ourselves alone. At the end of January of this year, we intimated to the Government at Peking and simultaneously to the Government of the South, that we were ready to modify some treaty rights offhand and other treaty rights as soon as conditions would admit. Since then, we have made more than one important move in that direction.

The explanation of this independent line of ours is simple. It is that our policy in China consists of "Peace, Security, and Trade" in no less degree than it does in Europe and everywhere else. The only difference is that the security part of our program is simpler, or perhaps I should say more elemental, than it is in some other parts of the world. There are

no questions of imperial security or imperial strategy for us to consider in China. We are merely concerned there with the safety of our nationals and of their property.

The fact that we have promised the broadest possible concessions to the legitimate aspirations of the nationalists does not and will not prevent us from doing our best to protect British subjects from the less pleasant manifestations of the nationalist ferment. Hence the dispatch of the Shanghai defense force last winter and hence the strong naval establishment which we maintain in Chinese waters.

It was realized from the first that precautions in that respect were bound to be misrepresented by the extremists, who would do their best to make their countrymen think that they cloaked offensive and acquisitive designs instead of being the purely defensive measures which, as I need not tell you, they were. That could not be helped. We comforted ourselves, moreover, by hoping that—whatever misrepresentation there might be at the time—the fact that we had had the courage and foresight to provide for the protection of the great foreign community at Shanghai from mob violence would not, in the long run, do British prestige any harm, especially if our appreciation of the fundamental significance of the nationalist movement turns out to be correct.

And that brings me to the principal thing that I want to bring out in this lecture. Our Chinese policy is largely based upon the feeling that the nationalist movement really represents something considerable in modern China—something, as I said just now, a good deal more than the Southern Government. It is that feeling, together with the magnitude of our ma-

terial interests in China, which has to no small extent made us take the independent line which I have just sketched.

I think that I may safely say that in adopting its forward policy the British Government was largely, though as I shall presently show not entirely, influenced by the hope that that policy, if it can be properly followed up, may diminish Chinese hostility towards us and other aliens and thus help to insure for the white man in the Far East sufficient peace, security, and trade to admit of the continued conduct of his various businesses there.

Our interests in China are so great and so important to us, they are so much greater than those of any other western country, that it was widely felt in Great Britain last winter that we simply could not afford to let things drift, whatever the other powers might elect to do. I am afraid that in order to justify that not altogether modest statement, I must aggravate my offense in making it by inflicting upon you some statistics.

In 1924 the value (I give the following figures very roughly) of trade between China and the British Empire was \$428,000,000 as compared with \$185,000,000 for the trade between China on the one hand and the United States and the Philippines on the other. The comparison is, it must be admitted, not quite so striking upon analysis, as the British Empire includes Hongkong, which is a great distributing center of Chinese trade, and the value of trade between Hongkong and China was \$260,000,000. Of this sum, however, it is probably fair to say that about two-thirds or at any rate more than half does, as a matter of fact, represent goods which went to

or came from Great Britain and other places in the Empire. French trade with China for the same year was valued at \$42,000,000; German at \$33,000,000; Russian at \$32,000,000. Japanese trade, it may be said in passing, was \$271,000,000. The total shipping, both coastwise and deep-sea, which went in and out of Chinese ports in 1924 amounted to 141,000,000 tons. Of this, 55,000,000 was British; 34,000,000, Japanese; 33,000,000, Chinese; and 6,000,000, American. Of the total foreign-secured Chinese debt, the capital and interest outstanding can be roughly estimated, I think, at about \$250,000,000. Of this sum, \$131,000,000 are due to us.

It is the same with the number of westerners living in China. One cannot, of course, get at really accurate figures but the customs authorities estimated that in 1925 the number of foreigners scattered about China was approximately as follows: British, 15,250; American, 9,850; Portuguese, 3,740; German, 3,050. The Japanese, of course, outnumbered all the westerners put together, with nearly 220,000, and the tale of Russians came up to about 80,000.

The Russian figures, I need hardly say, are artificial, so to speak. In every foreign community there have been, since the revolution, many White Russian refugees. And as we all know to our cost, the Bolshevik Russian has also not been absent from China. But I will not weary you with more handbook facts.

I think that it is really fair to say that in every important avocation, except in the missionary field, where you are the principal people, we come first among foreigners in China, in the import business as in the export business, in banking and finance as in

those branches of the Chinese civil service, namely, the all-important customs administration, the postal service, and the salt tax service, in the conduct of which foreigners are associated with Chinese, and for which, indeed, they bear the chief responsibility.

There has also been another consideration which has inclined British opinion to favor actively conciliatory treatment of the Chinese grievances. I said at the outset of these lectures that in describing our foreign policy I was going to keep what one can only call sentimental motives in the background. I am afraid that I must now break through that rule for a moment. I should be rather unfair to my countrymen, if I did not do so. There are many different opinions about the nationalist movement, but in one thing there is probably agreement, namely, that it is largely due to the impact of western civilization, and not always of the nicer side of that civilization, upon Chinese institutions and Chinese manners of thought. And for that impact, and especially for its earlier and rougher blows, Great Britain produced most of the driving force. Popular approval at home of our concessions to the new spirit in China is consequently in part due to desire to make some tardy reparation for the ruthlessness with which we overrode the old spirit of exclusiveness existing in China when we first went there. One has seen that clearly from comment in the press and elsewhere during the last year.

The Arabs and Persians had, of course, traded with the Far East for centuries. Imperial Rome drew upon the Middle Kingdom, the other great center of civilization during her era, for some of the luxuries which helped to hurry her into decadence.

Gibbon, if I remember rightly, talks of the slow progress of silk caravans across the continent of Asia until they met the outposts of Rome. The Portuguese settled early at Macao and dabbled in Chinese trade. Our British East India Company did the same at Canton. But in all these contacts, the Chinese had the upper hand, and dealt with the stranger on their own terms. They were, in their own estimation, a civilized race condescending to barely tolerated barbarians.

Let me read you some extracts from a memorial addressed to George III, when in 1793 a special mission was sent out by the British Government to Peking to try to open up tolerable trade relations. Some of you know the document, as it has already been published, but I will, nevertheless, give it you as it presents in a few minutes a better description of the state of the Chinese mind in those days than I could hope to do if I devoted the rest of the time at my disposal this evening to the task. The memorial was signed by the Chinese emperor of the time, and was addressed to George III in the following terms:

You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas; nevertheless impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. . . . I have perused your memorial. The earnest terms in which it is couched reveal a respectful humility on your part which is highly praiseworthy.

In consideration of the fact that your Ambassador and his deputy have come a long way with your memorial and tribute I have shown them high favour and have allowed them to be introduced into my presence. To manifest my

indulgence I have entertained them at a banquet and made them numerous gifts.

As to your entreaty to send one of your nationals to be accredited to my Celestial Court and to be in control of your country's trade with China, this request is contrary to all usage of my dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained. . . . If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that even if your envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore however adept the envoy might become nothing would be gained thereby.

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the state. Strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to despatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated into every country under heaven, and Kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious and have no use for your country's manufactures.

We British owe our present ascendancy in China to the fact that it was we who took in hand the breaking of that proud and exclusive spirit. The Napoleonic War, as I showed in a previous lecture, left us supreme in world trade. It left us, despite our internal and political difficulties, vibrant with energy. It turned the old adventuring spirit of the Drakes and Raleighs into the channels of foreign commerce.

A hundred years ago, our consciences were

troubled by no scruples about self-determination or the right of other nations to decide who should or who should not live and trade in their midst; nor were your consciences or those of any other nation. We all scrambled for the opportunities of the Chinese market. We all insisted that the Chinese should receive us upon our terms rather than upon their own. The only difference between us was that we were the first in the race because when the race started we were the pioneers in the field of international trade.

We fought the first war with China in the early forties of the last century and were in consequence the first country to sign the first batch of those unequal treaties of which the Chinese now complain. When, a decade later, it became apparent that the Chinese had no intention of living up to the promises which they had made us in these treaties, it was again the British, aided this time by the French, who did the fighting and gained further treaty concessions in which the rest of the world shared. And so it went until nearly the end of the nineteenth century. By slow degrees, with Great Britain more often than not in the lead, the powers built up for their nationals a position of privilege among an unwilling race.

At the end of the last century, it seemed almost as though China might break up under what looked to her inhabitants like the predatory pressure of the outside world. That was the period of territorial acquisitiveness and of spheres of influence. Various powers, ourselves included, leased harbors and footholds on Chinese soil. Various powers, ourselves included, tried to parcel China out into spheres in

which the traders and financiers of some particular country should have things more or less their own way.

The Chinese, I repeat, were to be excused if they espied in these processes the shadow of the impending partition of their land. Even in the western world, the voice of protest was raised. In 1899, I think it was, the United States promulgated her famous doctrine of the "Open Door" when Mr. John Hay, President McKinley's Secretary of State, addressed to the powers a circular note in which he asked for their adherence to a policy calculated to preserve China from partition and to assure for the nationals of all countries equal opportunities for trade within her boundaries.

We, I am glad to say, assented to the "Open Door" principle without demur or reservation. Russia was evasive and hostile. The other powers accepted with qualifications. Soon afterwards, however, came the Boxer uprising as a result of which China had to submit to further modifications in her relations with foreign powers, which clamped more firmly than ever upon her the authority of the alien.

My excuse for inflicting upon you the recapitulation of a familiar chapter of history is that it is an essential background not only of any study of the nationalist movement, but also of the present British policy towards China, or rather towards that movement. As a result of it all, the Chinese attitude towards the foreigner was, during the last century, one of ignorant and not unnaturally prejudiced antagonism, which occasionally flamed up into acts of violence. After 1900 and the lessons of the Boxer affair, there was a change in this attitude. Instead of

simply trying to drive the foreigner out, the Chinese began to try to learn the secret of his strength. They began to copy him as well as to dislike him. The old feeling of impotent superiority, if the phrase may be allowed, gave way to a period of equally impotent imitation on the surface and of revolutionary agitation underneath, strongly tinged with anti-foreign sentiment. That was, for practical purposes, the beginning of the nationalist movement.

After a decade of experiment with the political armory of the West during which the reformers proposed, but the old officials in effect disposed, the Manchu Empire was overthrown and the republic took its place. The change was in a sense pathetically premature. Though China in those days still had at least a central government, she was no more ready for the processes of western democracy than she is today or perhaps will ever be.

The empire fell in 1911. For a time the republic went surprisingly well. That was because it was under the dominating personality of Yuan Shi-k'ai. Under him the spirit of the old dispensation was still maintained under the ceremonial of the new. The only important change and, as present events show, it was a very important and sinister change, was that, in the provinces, power gradually passed from the civil governors, the successors of the old imperial viceroys, into the hands of military leaders, the Tuchuns of whom we have heard so much in recent years. So long as he lived, Yuan Shi-k'ai held these people in check. Most of them were his henchmen and parasites. But after his death, the central authority began to disintegrate, and the Tuchuns broke loose into armed competition and intrigue for

the high and lucrative places of government. For the last ten years, as you know, government has succeeded government in Peking, as unsubstantial and as little masters of their fate as Homer's twittering ghosts. In the provinces, too, Tuchun has followed Tuchun in usually temporary ascendancy, strutting his little hour in a position of relative authority, before succumbing to the intrigues of subordinates or the armed jealousies of rivals.

Those troubles gave the nationalist movement its chance and its justification. Revolutionary and anti-foreign tendencies crystallized into the Kuo Min Tang, in the name of which the Southern Government has been functioning and fighting. As the Peking Government declined and the Tuchuns gained strength, the Kuo Min Tang began to perform some of the functions of what, in more settled democratic countries, would be the party of progressive opposition.

If I have again been guilty of the recapitulation of facts about which many of you know a great deal more than I do, it is again because the British appraisal of the significance of the nationalist movement has largely been formed by our reading of those facts.

The two most talked of figures in the days when our relations with the South were to the fore last winter were Eugene Chen, the Foreign Minister of the Southern Government, and Borodin, the Russian mentor of that government.

Eugene Chen has not even always been officially a Chinese. He was born a British subject. His blood, according to some accounts, is not entirely Chinese. He was born in Trinidad, or at any rate lived there

for a considerable time. His son, who is or was his secretary in China, was a leading light in the football team of that island, having learned at any rate to play football at our university of Cambridge. One of Eugene Chen's brothers was for a time an elder in the Presbyterian Church. My authority for these details, who knew the family in Trinidad, omitted to tell me where, but I imagine it was in Trinidad. Another brother, at any rate, is in the British civil service in Trinidad and figures, I am told, in the Colonial Office list as Mr. A. Acham, chief clerk, at a salary of \$2,000 a year. Eugene Chen has practiced as an English-speaking lawyer and is superficially, at any rate, as British—there are, of course, many sorts of British—as he is Chinese. Before the War, he was a good deal in London, and for some reason or other came into contact with the Foreign Office. One of my colleagues, wishing to do the right thing by him, asked him to dinner. He awaited his arrival rather nervously, for he had not yet seen him, and it was the first time that he had entertained a Chinese. The door opened and in came an individual in immaculate evening dress, who addressed him in fluent English with an Irish accent.

Jacob Borodin, the excessively able Bolshevik agent with the South Government during its successes of last autumn and winter, is said to be a Lettish Jew originally called Michael Grusenberg. He is an almost perfect specimen of the Communist International agitator, popular disgust with whose activities had a great deal to do with our recent severance of diplomatic relations with the Moscow Government. He has in the past few years stirred up discontent and disloyalty in three continents, at least

so there is every reason to believe. After the War, somebody very like him was working as a communist propagandist in Spain. From Spain he seems to have gone to Mexico and from Mexico to have visited the United States on more than one occasion. By 1922 he was back on the other side of the Atlantic in Glasgow, which, for one reason and another, has always been a center of red activities. His alias in those days was John Brown, a name under which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for dangerous and subversive agitation and was, I think, deported—to come to the surface again in China.

These men—the Bolshevist agitator and organizer and the foreign-educated Chinese—are, of course, types of two very important elements in the nationalist movement. From the start the Kuo Min Tang has been to a great extent organized and expedited by men like Eugene Chen and, as you all know, the nationalist Government of the South owed a good deal of its material success last winter to the help which Borodin and his Bolshevik lieutenants gave it.

We have not, however, allowed this to influence unduly our Chinese policy. Many competent observers in London believe that the nationalist movement is fundamentally the result of what has been happening in Chinese internal affairs for the last twenty years and of China's contacts with the western world for the last century. The young Chinese of foreign education are of course trying to imbue it with the political ideas and practices of the West: but it is doubted whether they or their foreign ideas have been or are likely to be its real inspiration.

Nor is there much inclination to believe that Bol-

shevism is an essential or necessarily enduring ingredient of the movement.

Borodin originally met Sun Yat-sen, the great innovator of the southern movement, in exile in Shanghai, and accompanied him when he returned to Canton to reassume power there in 1923. There can be no doubt that in the ensuing years Borodin has had as much as any one to do with the turning of Chinese nationalism into active anti-British channels. But there is equally little doubt, in the opinion of those Englishmen best qualified to judge, that Sun Yat-sen did not take him on because he was our enemy. He took him on because the South needed outside assistance for the organization of its plans. The best outline of those plans of his is—as you doubtless know—to be found in his will. In that remarkable document, the Lenin of the nationalist movement invoked what he called the three principles of the people, namely, nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood. These ideals, he stated, could only be realized in three stages: by what he called militarism, tutelage, and nationalism. By this he meant that military force had to be used to destroy the Tuchuns of the North, that the people must remain under the tutelage of the Kuo Min Tang until they had acquired a political consciousness which would enable them to attain the constitutional and final stage and enjoy a full measure of self-government. Neither in his will nor anywhere else is there any indication so far as I know that Sun Yat-sen was a convert to the Russian doctrine of communism and class warfare. On the contrary, his principles are opposed to Bolshevism.

In the headquarters of no political party in Lon-

don, nowhere, in fact, except among extreme conservatives of the type who regard everything new as dangerous, will you find much sympathy with the theory that the nationalist movement is factitious, that it is the result of alien intrigue and propaganda, that it is little more than a weapon forged by Moscow to strike at western institutions in general and at the British Empire in particular.

Had that been the view of political and public opinion at home, you can take it for granted that we should not have made our liberal gesture to China last winter. Virtually the whole press, with the exception of a few obscurantist organs which still think that the best way of dealing with Asiatics is with the big stick and the contemptuous word, applauded that gesture. It did so not because it ignored the importance of the Bolshevik influence in southern China as it existed at that moment, but because it believed that that influence was probably rather the product of ephemeral opportunism than the result of a settled conviction on the part of the majority of Chinese progressive leaders.

Recall for a moment what the plight of Sun Yat-sen's movement was when he met Borodin in 1923. It could hope for nothing from the western world, which suspected its anti-foreign and supposedly communist tendencies. The embargo upon the export of arms was in operation against it. Money was obviously not forthcoming from London or New York for a revolutionary movement in the Far East. Some money might have percolated into Canton from Chinese overseas. Some munitions may have been brought up from the sea in devious contraband ways. But not enough to set up the expensive army and

finance the expensive military and propagandist campaign which Sun Yat-sen had in mind for the overthrow of the despotisms of the North and for the abolition of the one-sided treaties.

One can imagine Borodin coming to Sun Yat-sen in his perplexity and offering him the assistance of Moscow and sympathizing with him as the representative of another Asiatic power in his determination to make the western powers recognize China as an equal. Russia as a matter of fact was then on the verge of cleverly negotiating with the Peking Government a formal agreement whereby all previous treaties between Russia and China which abridged Chinese sovereign rights were abrogated and the privileges of extraterritoriality were abandoned by Moscow.

One can imagine Borodin showing the southern patriot how Russia was in a position to pour money, men and munitions, drill sergeants and organizers into Canton so that in a short time the South should have an army at least as well equipped as the armies of the North, and trained and drilled by officers who had had some experience of the European War. One can imagine how much impressed Sun Yat-sen may well have been by an exposition of those Russian propaganda methods which have since been of such invaluable assistance to the Southern armies, sending ahead of them, like waves of poison gas, a fringe of agitators to stir up popular opinion and undermine the morale of the civil and indeed military followers of their opponents.

But all that need not necessarily mean that Sun Yat-sen and his successors had or have any more intention of letting Bolshevism permanently domi-

nate their movement than the Japanese had of permanently surrendering to white men the control of their army, navy, and industry, when, in the days of their transition from eastern medievalism to western modernism they collected from the countries of the West instructors in our arts of peace and war. What seems to have happened is that it suited the South to use the Russians in their nationalist campaign, and that it suited the Russians to help a movement which they hoped would hurt the interests of foreigners and especially of the British and to acquire as much authority as they could in China.

Such, anyhow, is the diagnosis widely accepted in the British Islands of the relations between Bolshevism and Chinese nationalism. It is not, I must repeat, merely the view of the British Government. There has been a great spread recently of intelligent interest at home in the Chinese problem. It is not only that its immense importance is beginning to be grasped, that it is beginning to be realized that partly owing to procrastination and divided councils of the powers a situation has been promoted which, unless we are careful, may at least cost us a large part of our material stake in the Far East, perhaps for many years to come.

There is also the feeling that we owe something to the Chinese. That feeling is, as I have already said, due partly to a study of our early relations with China, but not entirely. British public and especially political opinion is by no means happy about our relations with China since the War. The more it studies the Chinese situation, the more uncomfortable it is when it tries to imagine what the relatively few Chinamen who attend at all to such things must

think of the failure of the western powers to live up to the promises and assurances which they have made China in the last ten years especially when they compare it with Russian treatment of China since the War. I have already told you how Russia has given China equal rights. What have we done?

When, for our own purposes, we prevailed upon China to declare war against the Central Powers, we promised that we would do all that we could to assure that in the future she had, in her international relations, the position and regard due to a great country. And yet her delegates at the Peace Conference got nothing, and less than nothing, for the Japanese were allowed to stay in Shantung, a fact which, if I remember rightly, did a good deal to discredit the peace settlement in American eyes. There may have been good ground for feeling that in 1919 China was not ready to take up the position of a great country. But that is not what matters. As I have had occasion to say more than once in these lectures, one does not get very far in foreign affairs if one ignores the other side's point of view, be that point of view well taken or the reverse.

Then there were the Washington treaties. The delay in implementing the concessions promised in those treaties may have been due largely to the inability of the Chinese to evolve a government with which we could do business. The British Government has, for instance, been waiting for some years for the authorities in Peking to be in a position to clinch the draft agreement for the rendition of Wei-Hai-Wei. But it would be unreasonable to expect an ardent nationalist to pay much attention to that fact, especially as the private diplomacy of a Euro-

pean power was to blame for the postponement of the conference in which we had promised to overhaul the Chinese tariff in the interests of China.

And while we seemed to the Chinese to be dallying with our promises and playing with their aspirations, we had whetted their appetite for concessions regarding unequal treaties, extraterritoriality, and so on, by depriving the Germans and Austrians of their special rights in China at the peace settlement, and by giving to a small oriental nation—to Turkey, who had defied us by arms and been defeated—practically everything that the Chinese wanted. And to cap everything, the Tariff Conference, of which so much was expected, met in Peking last year, labored lengthily, and disbanded without producing more than the hint of a mouse.

In my next lecture I propose to give you some account of the actual steps which we have and are taking to translate into practice our policy of reasonable concessions and to deal with some of the other aspects of that policy which may possibly be of interest to you. But before doing that I wanted to try to explain what many people at home consider to be the historical and political background, the chief practical and ethical sanction of that policy.

CONCESSION AND CONCILIATION IN CHINA

I HAVE tried to give you the background of our policy in China. I have shown you why that policy is largely based upon the assumption that the nationalist movement is now a vital factor in Chinese political life. I must repeat that by the nationalist movement I mean something more than the nationalist party of the South. I mean the growing desire among leaders of Chinese thought for better government, and above all for equality with other nations. I also suggested that, though our interest in China is essentially material and concerns trade, an additional warrant for our desire to meet so far as possible the Chinese claim for equality is held by British opinion to be found in the fact that the Chinese have some justification for thinking that we British were mainly responsible for the one-sided arrangements which the western countries forced upon China in the old days. Nor is it forgotten that the western powers have in recent years promised concessions and then failed to grant them in a way which gives the Chinese some excuse for dissatisfaction.

Public opinion at home supports the liberal policy, which a realization of these facts has done much to cause our government to adopt. The white community in the Far East has been less happy about it. You remember what mutterings came from that community after the Washington Conference. Both our governments were accused of having fallen victims to a spasm of unpractical sentiment, of having been

“bamboozled” by the Chinese delegation and so on. This difference of opinion between London and our people on the spot is no new thing. Nearly a hundred years ago when we were still trying to persuade the Chinese to allow us to trade freely with them, before their somewhat aggressive exclusiveness had brought on our first war with them, one finds one of our earliest officials in the Far East writing as follows to Lord Palmerston, who was then the British foreign minister:

The peaceful and conciliatory policy by which the King’s Government appear to me to desire to maintain and promote commercial intercourse with this Empire is not very generally approved by the fifty or sixty residents in Canton, and the determination to give it effect is the least pleasant task that I could have proposed to myself.

Our new policy was as sharply criticized last winter by the more vocal part of British opinion in the Far East as that first abortive effort at liberalism seems to have been a century ago. A little later we were again attacked for giving up the Hankow concession. Our government together with your government and the other governments concerned were criticized for not using force in order to bring to book those responsible for the Nanking outrages. At the time of the Canton boycott we were always being told in the Foreign Office that the only way to break the boycott was by force. Sometimes we were asked to bombard Canton. At other times it was suggested that we might blockade the city. But nobody ever explained to us how the destruction of Canton would help our trade with it, or how we were to blockade the waterways leading up to it without

falling foul of other powers whose flags fly upon shipping in the Far East.

Just before I left London I happened to pick up a newspaper with an article in it in which a well-known writer on Chinese affairs, a man who has lived most of his life in the Far East, deplored what he called the weakness of our policy in China and proclaimed that if we would only send expeditions up rivers and so on, China would in a few years be completely under the thumb of the white man.

Such advice falls flat at home not only for the reasons which I gave you in my last lecture—reasons which in themselves would have been decisive—but for other reasons as well. Those who shout loudest are not always those who think most deeply; and though the more vocal part of British opinion in the Far East may have been critical of our Chinese policy there are signs that there is another section of opinion there which a growing number of the leading business men share in favor of the line we have taken.

Again—and this is the really important point—criticism of our policy is, when all is said and done, nearly always based upon the assumption that if necessary we could employ—and employ effectively—what might easily become an unlimited amount of force in China. That is an assumption which finds no more acceptance in London than I imagine it does in Washington. Our whole Chinese policy is based to-day upon a strong and widely held belief that from every point of view forcible intervention in the affairs of China cannot safely or decently be contemplated.

We are prepared now, as always, as I said in my

last lecture, to use force locally to protect our nationals wherever we can. But it is difficult to see how we would ever impose our wills upon the Chinese by force. I cannot imagine that any British Government will ever try to police waterways or railways or go in for coercive expeditions on a large scale. The time in fact is long past when a repetition of the wars by which we imposed ourselves upon China in the last century is either possible or desirable.

The one application of force which could conceivably be effective in these days would be joint action by all the western nations against China; and can anyone imagine such a crusade? Would the voters in Great Britain or the United States or any other country consent to go into another war, to embark upon an unthinkable expensive venture which would run counter to all the best instincts of the age, which would inflame the whole East and might lead to all sorts of complications and which, even if successful, would not get us what we want? Suppose the impossible happened and the crusade took place, and we beat China to her knees and established strong points all over her vast territory, and kept lines of communication open between those points, and so on. How would that help us? How much trade would it bring us with a people who are essentially self-supporting and have shown us that they understand the art of the boycott?

Just as Mr. Lloyd George fell from office largely because in the autumn of 1922 he was believed nearly to have involved us in war with Turkey, so a British Government which tried forcible intervention in China might well find the British electorate as averse from war in the Far East in these days as it was then

from war in the Near East. Apart from everything else, we at home have suffered and are still suffering far too much from one war to be willing to risk another military adventure which might grow to almost any size and which, moreover, would be very generally considered to be as unjustifiable from the moral point of view as it would be unfruitful from the material point of view.

We have, as a matter of fact, had twice in the last two years some pretty conclusive object lessons of the harm that can be done in China by a display of force even locally and homeopathically in the interests of law and order. Early in 1925, there were labor troubles in the Japanese textile mills at Shanghai. At the end of May a prolonged agitation culminated in an anti-Japanese demonstration through the streets of the international settlement. There were arrests; a mob followed the prisoners to the police station and became menacing. The inspector in charge gave orders to fire. Twelve rioters were killed, and seventeen wounded. There was considerable controversy among foreign residents in Shanghai as to whether the shooting might have been avoided had the police authorities taken greater precautions, and the head of the police, who was an Englishman, resigned after being suspended during an inconclusive inquiry.

It is doubtful whether the possibility that that shooting may have been due in part to lack of efficiency in a white man's organization aggravated the offense from the Chinese point of view. The mere fact that there had been deaths was enough to inflame sentiment and to start an agitation which led to acts of violence against foreigners and especially

against us. In particular it led to a monster demonstration in Canton a few weeks later, during which the demonstrators fired into the French and British concessions on Shameen, and had their fire returned, with fatal results. Out of that incident came the long anti-British boycott and strike, from the effects of which Hongkong is only just recovering.

The shootings at Shameen and Shanghai did immense harm to the process of conciliation upon which our governments had agreed in Washington. They were of great assistance to the Russians and Chinese extremists in stirring up feeling against the foreigner in general and against ourselves in particular. The cry for the abolition of the unequal treaties spread like wildfire. The Peking Government, not to be outdone by the Southerners, began to denounce treaties as they fell due. A treaty with France on trade and frontier matters was the first victim, the Belgian commercial treaty came next, and after it the Japanese commercial treaty.

Things were made worse by the failure of the Tariff Conference at Peking. The Tariff Conference was intended to implement the promises made in Washington to grant China certain tariff increases. Those increases, which are known as the Washington surtaxes, would have allowed the Chinese Government to raise the import tax on ordinary goods from 5 to 7½ per cent and on luxuries to 10 per cent. The Washington Conference had expected the Tariff Conference to meet in a few months' time, but it was delayed for over three years owing to the refusal of France to ratify the Washington treaties until she had obtained from China a promise to pay install-

ments of the Boxer indemnity due to France in gold and not in paper francs.

The Tariff Conference was at last convened in the autumn of 1925, when the anti-foreign ferment was at its height. As a result, the Peking Government felt constrained to ask for more than it had been promised at Washington. It asked, among other things, for complete and immediate tariff autonomy. It got nothing except an unofficial semi-promise of tariff autonomy in 1929. The conference failed because while it was in session the authority of the central Chinese Government became attenuated to the vanishing point, before the powers had agreed among themselves regarding the program which they were to put before the Chinese.

The failure of the Tariff Conference and its unfortunate reactions upon Chinese opinion and policy was, as I have already told you, the immediate reason for our striking out on a new line last winter. It seemed most improbable that the conference could be reconvened at anything like an early date, with any real hope of success, if only on account of the unlikelihood of the establishment for a long time to come of a central government strong enough for the powers to deal with satisfactorily.

It was felt in London that unless something could be done at once to show that the spirit of the Washington Conference still lived, the position and prestige of the foreigner in China would be badly hit. There was especial concern about the Washington surtaxes. It had been evident some time before the break-up of the Tariff Conference that the Southern Government would take the Washington surtaxes for itself if it was not given them. It did so at Canton

almost immediately after the failure of the conference. The representatives of the powers in Peking made a formal protest against the illegality of its action. We joined in the protest reluctantly. It did not seem likely that it would lead anywhere. The collection of taxes, equivalent to the Washington surtaxes, was not, moreover, the only measure that Canton was taking to modernize its community. It was trying to impose upon foreign residents various regulations, some of them reasonable enough, from which under the rules of extraterritoriality foreigners were immune. Opposition by the powers to that sort of thing could only be effective if backed by force, and force, it must be repeated, appeared to be out of the question except for the actual protection of life and property.

Moreover, almost simultaneously with the collapse of the Tariff Conference, another body appointed by the Washington Conference, namely the Commission on Extraterritoriality, finished its work in Peking and in a report signed by the representatives of thirteen powers found that the gradual winding up of extraterritoriality ought to be considered. The Chinese contention that the time had come for the reform of the one-sided treaties was thus reënforced by the authority of a competent western expert commission, as well as by the more general findings of the Washington Conference.

Such were the principal circumstances which were deemed to demand another effort to assure the Chinese, and especially the nationalist movement, that the powers—despite the break-down of the Tariff Conference and the difficulties imposed upon them by the lack of a controlling government in

China—were determined to recognize rather than to ignore, and to help rather than to thwart the reasonable aspirations of progressive Chinese.

We hence determined to take a leaf out of the American book, and like Mr. John Hay in 1899, to address to the powers a memorandum asking them to join in a declaration of readiness to do all that they could to reassure Chinese opinion. The memorandum was communicated to the representatives of the Washington Treaty powers in Peking, on December 18, 1926. After calling attention to the way in which the political disintegration of China had prevented the powers from carrying out the program of treaty revision contemplated by the Washington Conference, the British Government proposed that in a joint statement the powers should abandon the idea that the economic and political development of China could only be secured under foreign tutelage.

The memorandum suggested that the powers should—what follows is a string of extracts and not a solid quotation—“declare their readiness to recognize China’s right to enjoy tariff autonomy as soon as she herself has settled and promulgated a new national tariff. They should expressly disclaim any intention of forcing foreign control on an unwilling China, and while calling upon China to maintain that respect for the sanctity of treaties which is the primary obligation of all civilized states, the powers should yet recognize both the essential justice of the Chinese claim for treaty revision and the difficulty under present conditions of negotiating new treaties in the place of the old, and that they should therefore modify their traditional attitude of rigid insistence

on the strict letter of treaty rights. . . . It would therefore be wise to abandon the policy of ineffective protest over minor matters, reserving protest . . . which should then be made effective by united action, only for cases where vital interests are at stake. . . . The declaration should show that it is the policy of the powers to endeavor to maintain harmonious relations with China without waiting for or insisting on the prior establishment of a strong central government."

The memorandum expressed the strong conviction of the British Government that the powers ought to authorize the immediate levy of the Washington surtaxes unconditionally throughout China. The real gist of the suggestions it contained was that the powers, instead of increasing their commitments and extending international interference in Chinese affairs, should seek to preserve their authority only when it seemed essential to do so. Above all, it seemed to us to be essential to preserve, if possible, the customs administration, that complicated foreign-controlled organization, which alone stands between China and financial chaos and bankruptcy. Canton had already taken upon itself the collection of the Washington surtaxes and the powers had already protested. Had the powers provoked a crisis by trying to follow up their protest, the fat might very well have been in the fire. The Southern Government might have retaliated by trying to collect not only the surtaxes but the rest of the duties as well. Their action in that respect we should have been powerless to stop by force without precipitating even worse trouble. And if Canton had taken such a step other parts of China might have done the same.

It soon became apparent that Sir Austen Chamberlain was going to be no more successful in securing the effective adherence of the powers to his suggestions than Mr. John Hay had been a quarter of a century earlier to his doctrine of the "Open Door." So convinced were we, however, of the necessity of immediate concessions of one sort or another along the lines that we had laid down that, after a short delay, we determined to take the grave step of independent action. The objections to breaking away from the powers were not ignored, but it seemed to us that the objections to doing nothing were considerably worse so far at any rate as we were concerned. Not only would the Chinese become more than ever convinced that the promises of the Washington Conference were insincere, but we, together with the other powers, would become more and more deeply involved with the Chinese authorities in disputes over often unimportant details about which we should, in the last resort, be powerless to assert our views and which might result not only in the progressive deterioration of our trade but also—as I have said—in the sweeping away of the custom service and the other foreign controlled services which are doing so much to bring China through her present difficulties.

At the end of January, therefore, we communicated to the Chinese authorities at Peking and Hankow, a memorandum setting forth the steps which we were preparing to take offhand for the modifications of the one-sided treaties. The main object of the memorandum was to overcome the difficulty presented by the fact that the Chinese possessed no government with which to negotiate a revision of

the treaties by devising a program of treaty alteration, the various items of which could be carried into effect by unilateral action on the part of Great Britain alone, without the necessity of negotiating new treaties. I will not recapitulate the terms of the memorandum. They are well known to many of you. Of its seven clauses, six dealt with various aspects of extraterritoriality such as law courts procedure, the status of missionaries, and so on. The other clauses dealt with the status of our Treaty Port concessions and settlements.

Roughly speaking, the principal changes which the Chinese desire in their relations with foreigners are, as you know, the modification of extraterritorial privileges, tariff autonomy and a modification of a quasi-independent status of the foreign concessions. About the tariff, we had already shown the Chinese that we were willing to make a start upon the path which it is to be hoped will lead eventually to tariff autonomy. Nor were we objecting to their taking the equivalent of the Washington surtaxes locally for their own uses. About extraterritoriality, all the powers had shown good intentions by virtue of the report of the Extraterritoriality Commission. Only about the concessions had nothing been done, except for discussions about admitting the Chinese to a greater share in the control of the International Settlement of Shanghai, and except for such things as the admission of Chinese to the British Municipal Council at Tientsin.

And yet the foreign concession system is to a great extent obsolete. Devised originally to give the foreign communities some of the amenities of western civilization, to be in fact centers where white men

could live their own lives, the concessions and settlements in most cases had become, in the course of time, more or less mixed up with the Chinese cities around them. In Shanghai there are large foreign streets radiating out from the International Settlement into Chinese territory in all directions, serving white men's suburbs, clubs, factories, and so on, with western-owned street car systems and automobile facilities. Inversely, about forty Chinese live within the International Settlement to every single foreigner. In Hankow, the four largest British business establishments are all outside the British settlement and one of the reasons, when the concession was rushed by Chinese mobs last winter, that we did not defend it by force, was that the crisis came unexpectedly and that a large proportion of our nationals, men, women, and children, were in their homes far outside the boundaries of the concession and might have been massacred had we infuriated the mob.

Nor are the majority of our concessions of any use as strong points in time of trouble. There are few that could be held as the Shanghai settlement might be held against attack. Some in fact are virtually useless even in normal times for trading purposes. Again, if the nature of our tenure of them is obnoxious to the Chinese and makes for bad feeling towards the foreigner, then the first object of those inhabiting them is defeated, namely, to be on terms of good will with their Chinese neighbors so as to do business with them.

Our memorandum to the Chinese consequently indicated that the British Government was prepared to enter into local arrangements either for the amal-

gamation of the administration of settlements with that of adjacent areas under Chinese control or for some other method of handing over the administration to the Chinese while assuring the British community of a voice in municipal matters. We were, of course, under no delusion that the surrender of our special privileges would improve the efficiency of the administration of the concession areas. It was, in fact, a case of present sacrifice to further larger and longer aims. Our promises regarding extraterritoriality and so on obviously could not be made good overnight. Our promises regarding a modification of our concession policy, we had a chance of implementing almost before they had been made.

I alluded just now to the rushing of our settlement at Hankow by Chinese mobs at the beginning of January. That incident was the culmination of a period of anti-foreign agitation accompanied by strikes, boycotts, and much inflammatory propaganda which followed the occupation last year by the Southerners of Hankow and its sister cities. As I said, the local British authorities wisely allowed the mob to enter the settlement without resistance, partly on account of the large number of British then isolated outside the settlement, and also because they knew that bloodshed would inflame passions against us and other foreigners from one end of China to the other, like the shooting at Shanghai the year before. They had in fact information that it was the deliberate intention of Borodin and his Russians to try to stage an incident which would force us to shoot.

Instead of demanding reparation or making the incident an occasion for fresh encroachment upon

the sovereignty of China as we should have done in the old days, we took the opportunity the incident presented of showing that we meant what we said when we promised to modify the terms upon which we held our concessions in China. After lengthy and sometimes discouraging negotiations with the Southern Government, we reached a settlement whereby the British Government Council of the British concession was to be dissolved and give way to a municipal government of which the director should be Chinese and the remaining six members should be half British and half Chinese. A similar arrangement was made at Kiukiang, another town on the Yangtse, which had come under the control of the South. With the Peking Government, too, we opened negotiations about the present state of which I am unfortunately in ignorance regarding the rendition of the Tientsin concession to Chinese sovereignty, negotiations the initiation of which was facilitated by the liberal attitude of the British community there.

Our equal-handed treatment of the North and the South in this matter brings me to another cardinal point of our Chinese policy. British policy has never played favorites between this faction and that faction, or between this leader and that leader. It is not purely a case of our devotion to the doctrine of self-determination, though I hope that that enters into it. We are influenced by more practical considerations as well. We believe that any kind of intervention between the factions in China would be fatal. In the early days of the success of the southern movement, when nearly everybody seemed to think it a Bolshevik puppet and nothing more, the British Govern-

ment was constantly importuned to support the North by loans and so on. To such representations there was always the same answer. China must be allowed to settle her own destiny. To interfere would be to add another count to her indictment of foreign methods, and would almost certainly do more harm than good. Intervention seemed well calculated to destroy the leader it was meant to help, for he would stand tarred with the brush of foreign support in a country where distrust of the foreigner is a ruling sentiment.

In the same way we refused to recognize the South when we were dealing with it last winter just as firmly as we refused to show preference to the Nanking Government when it set itself up a few months later as a moderate rival of the extremist government at Hankow. We have dealt with all factions and parties so far as may be necessary for practical purposes, but beyond that we have not gone and are not, I should think, likely to go. Indeed the sudden disappearance of the Nanking Government cannot but strengthen our policy of impartiality against the assaults of those impetuous critics of ours who are so often spotting some horse upon which they think that we ought to put our money.

Such roughly are the practical elements of our Chinese policy. Let me recapitulate them as concisely as I can. Our first concern is to maintain our position in the trade of China and to secure protection for our subjects there. Our second concern is to carry on the open door policy. Our third concern is to do what we can, in conjunction with the other powers if possible, to reassure China as to the sincerity of the promises which we gave her at Wash-

ington. Our fourth concern is to find means, preferably in conjunction with other powers but if not alone, to carry out something of those promises even though China has no central government with which we can deal effectively. Our fifth concern is to do nothing that might hinder the Chinese from working out their own political and social destiny. Everybody hopes that they will in the end achieve a central government strong enough to assure a united, peaceful and prosperous China; but British opinion does not think that it would expedite such a government to throw our diplomatic or financial weight or the weight of our armed forces on the side of this or that leader or faction. From that it emerges that our sixth concern is to avoid anything in the nature of forcible intervention in the affairs of China or to employ force there in any way except, if needs be, locally for the protection of British subjects.

I hope that in talking as I have done about the nationalist movement, I have not misled you into thinking that that movement is regarded at home as having very much in common with a democratic or progressive movement in a western country. I should be surprised if in the councils of any of our parties in England, anybody could be found who seriously thinks that nationalism in China is going to produce anything like western democratic government, in the immediate or even perhaps in the distant future. It is realized that nothing has yet happened to show that the Chinese are capable of centralized representative government.

On the contrary, it seems to most of us that in one way or another, the Chinese have in recent years given reasons for doubt whether they are capable of

anything of the sort. The Republic in Peking collapsed as soon as it lost the impetus of the old imperial administration, and since then such more or less effective government as there has been in the North has been in the nature of one-man autocracy and has certainly had nothing democratic about it.

In the South, too, the nationalist government has yet to prove that it can function in a democratic manner. Nor will you find any misapprehension in London as to the relative statistical insignificance of the nationalist ferment. Everybody realizes that only a very small, an almost infinitesimal proportion of the population of China, are interested in it or even perhaps know of its existence. I do not think, however, that undue importance is attached to that fact. All the great movements of history, like almost all natural growths, have had small beginnings. And this must be especially the case in a country as vast and dispersed geographically and socially as China is.

When I spoke the other evening about the impression that Sun Yat-sen is believed by many Europeans to have made upon the Chinese mind, I meant not upon the mind of the Chinese people but upon the minds of the relatively small number of men who, in a country which still lacks to a great extent our facilities for the spreading of ideas among the masses, must presumably represent to no small extent both public opinion and the leadership of that opinion.

I think that perhaps the best way to describe the dominant British conception of the nationalist movement is to say that it seems to us to present a possibility rather than a fixed fact. It seems more than

anything else in China potentially capable, if adequately directed, of fitting in with the growing aspirations of a slowly awakening nation, aspirations which the demands of equity no less than the dictates of expediency compel us to take seriously.

The present nationalist government may come to nothing. It may be torn to bits by different factions, especially if it loses the cohesive stimulus of progressive success. It may be discredited by its lunatic fringe of communism or by the subservience of some of its chiefs to alien dictation for it would be rash to think that Borodin's present eclipse from the constellation of the Southern leaders necessarily means a permanent decline of the influence of Bolshevism in China. It may be sacrificed to the personal ambitions of its leaders. It may be merged in some other government. It may break up into various movements or governments. Anything may happen to it and anything may happen to government in the North.

It may be years, it may even be generations, before China settles down under a central authority, and even then that central authority may have little or nothing in common with our western political institutions. Or the country may never settle down into a single political community. It may break up. Some of its units may achieve steady administration of some kind or other. Others may not. But whatever happens it seems logically possible that both in the North and South, whoever aspires to govern either on a large or small scale will have to pay more and more attention to the doctrines and demands of Sun Yat-sen.

If that is the case then surely nothing can be lost

and something may perhaps be gained, by trying to do something more than lip-service to the legitimate aspirations of the nationalists. It may be possible to strengthen the hands of moderate Chinese who dislike communism and the Russian influence and feel that the more intercourse their countrymen can have with the westerner, the better for their prosperity. And finally, if China, or any considerable part of China, should settle down in anything like the early future, then an active liberal policy on our part, and, as we hope, on the part of other nations, ought to help the position and prestige of the foreigner in China.

If, on the other hand, there is to be a prolonged period of chaos, we shall not have lost anything.

All of you must have heard of the late Sir John Jordan, one of the wisest and most far-seeing of that little group of great foreigners whose names will always be identified with the China of the generation which is now just over. The scene of the last and not the least of the many services which he rendered both to Great Britain and to China was, indeed, in this country, where he was our chief representative on Far Eastern matters at the Washington Conference. Sir John Jordan ended his consular and diplomatic career in the Far East as our minister in Peking during the War. When I was looking through some Chinese papers in the archives of the Foreign Office before coming over here, I happened to turn up a dispatch which he had sent home just before the Peace Conference. In this dispatch Sir John argued strongly for the immediate introduction by the powers of very much those reforms in their relations with China which they have since promised.

The time, he suggested, had come when the system of one-sided treaties should be modified including, of course, the tariff system, extraterritoriality and so on. He wrote:

I have watched the evolution of this country through its most difficult and dramatic stages; the gradual breaking down of the national arrogance and the rise and fall of a few great men, the slow but certain advance of a new political thought; and the hammer blows of so-called enterprise perpetually battering at the so-called open door.

Unless the signs deceive me, this great nation is rousing itself from sleep and bidding fair to renew its mighty youth. Perhaps it is too much to hope for the full realization of so drastic a change as I have ventured to urge for the solution of the Far Eastern problem. But I believe that reform would come more easily if it came with sudden and impelling force, absorbing petty disagreements and petty jealousies in a wave of a greater policy inspired by a desire for the regeneration of China in the interests of the world. I trust that our country will not play a halting part but that we shall continue to lead as we have always led in China and that, with our feet on the solid ground of experience, we shall allow our eyes to look towards a broader and brighter Eastern horizon on which China will stand strong and self-reliant as a healthy and helpful partner in the comity of nations.

That was written in 1918. The Paris Conference ignored his advice; but at the Washington Conference, where, if I remember rightly, the present American Minister at Peking acted as his fellow expert on China, Sir John Jordan had the satisfaction of seeing it accepted. Unfortunately, the reforms promised at Washington have not come with that sudden and compelling force which he advocated. They have hardly come at all, as yet. It may be that

even our modest effort to do something about them will produce but little. We may have begun too late. Circumstances which we cannot control may render our program impossible. Our critics may thus prove to be right in proclaiming its futility. But perhaps it is better than nothing that we should at any rate be trying to travel the road which now seems to the majority of our people at home to be the right road just as it did to the greatest of British authorities on China ten years ago.

VI

THE RUSSIAN QUESTION

I HAVE left Russia until the end because, unfortunately, she is now outside the picture of our active foreign relations. I should, indeed, have been tempted to ignore her altogether, except where she impinged upon other questions, like that of China, had I not felt that you might like to hear something about the recent rupture of diplomatic intercourse between London and Moscow.

It was no part of the policy of the present Conservative government, in spite of the agitation of a noisy minority in its ranks, and still less was it the policy of the Labor and Liberal oppositions, to break with Moscow. When the Council of the League of Nations met last June, there was a good deal of gossip in Geneva to the effect that our government had engineered the rupture as a preliminary to an effort to persuade the countries of western Europe to form an anti-Russian bloc, as the continental phrase goes. I can assure you that there was nothing in that gossip. A principal object of our foreign policy, as I explained in my earlier lectures, is to get nations to live in amity with each other and to prevent the formation of hostile groups. One of the reasons, indeed, for our long drawn patience with Moscow was our desire to do nothing that might cause fresh uncertainties in Europe.

The rupture came because the British people had gradually made up their minds that it was undignified and perhaps dangerous to allow a government

which was continually trying to interfere in their own affairs and made no secret of its determination to do everything possible to ruin the British Empire to maintain in London diplomatic representatives and official trade agents.

The break, in fact, was psychologically due. If it had not been produced by the so-called Arcos raid, it would have come over something else. Only a few months before, Sir Austen Chamberlain had formally told Moscow that our patience was being worn very thin. He did so in the course of a protest against the steady continuance of anti-British propaganda. We have had indeed ample technical grounds for ejecting the Russian official representatives in London at any time during the six years of their stay there, had we wanted to. They have never been in a state of diplomatic grace. May I take you over a little past history to justify that statement?

The instrument which down to last May governed our relations with Moscow was the Trade Agreement of 1921. The Trade Agreement was concluded subject to the condition that each party should refrain "from hostile action or undertakings against the other and from conducting outside of its own borders any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the British Empire or the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more particularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any other peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire."

The Trade Agreement was signed in March, 1921. In September of that year we were obliged to com-

plain officially that not only were the Bolshevist chiefs in Moscow publicly proclaiming their conviction that, in the words of Stalin "the problems connected with the class struggle in the East will be incomparably easier of solution if the external power of France and England [that is to say, their position in the East] can be undermined," but we were able to adduce evidence of Russian intrigue and propaganda against our interests in India, Persia, Turkestan, and Afghanistan.

In May, 1923, there was a further interchange of notes arising out of fresh complaints on our part of propaganda against us by Russian diplomatic representatives in the same parts of the world, in the course of which we said:

It cannot be too emphatically impressed upon the Soviet government that it was the pledge given by it that propaganda would cease, a pledge which it embodied in the text of the Trade Agreement, that rendered the conclusion of that Agreement possible, and that the observance of this pledge remains an essential condition of it. Nevertheless, this solemn obligation has been continually and systematically violated by agents of the Soviet government.

After the Labor party came into office six months later, there was an attempt to get into closer relations with Moscow and to replace the Trade Agreement by a general treaty of amity and commerce. The government of the Union of Soviet and Socialist Republics was recognized as the *de jure* ruler of those territories of the old Russian Empire which acknowledged its authority. This enabled the Russians to maintain diplomatic representation in London as well as the trade delegation authorized by the Trade Agreement three years earlier.

Beyond that the effort of the Labor party to bring about better relations came to nothing. A Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed and also a General Treaty which contained a mutual promise to negotiate further about the debt question and a promise on the part of the British Government to put before Parliament a project for the guaranteeing by it of the service of a loan to be raised by the Soviet Government; but both treaties remained inoperative as the Labor government had fallen on another issue before they could be brought forward in Parliament and the succeeding Conservative government let them lapse. Then came the Zinovieff letter incident, the publication of an authentic copy of a letter written by the head of the Third International to the head of the British Communist party giving that party instructions as to the best methods for upsetting the British Commonwealth.

The Zinovieff letter revealed as a fact what public opinion had long been pretty certain of, namely, that it was not only on the fringes of civilization that the Russians were attacking us, but that they were also conducting a subversive campaign in our very midst. The letter would have given the Conservative party, when it returned to office a month or two after its publication, good grounds for turning the Russian representatives out of London, but the time had not come for such a step.

Public and political opinion, though irritated, was not yet ready for a break. There were various reasons for its patience. The first was trade. Long before the Trade Agreement was concluded, Mr. Lloyd George had been attracted by a vision of what he called "the bursting corn bins," or as you would

say wheat bins, of Russia. It was hoped that if Russia could start exporting her foodstuffs to us, she would be in a position to take our manufactured products. The second reason for our patience was our desire to do nothing which might cause embarrassment in central Europe and among the countries which border upon Russia. Right down to the eve of the break, that reason was steadily adduced by members of the government and especially by Sir Austen Chamberlain as the chief consideration which made us overlook Russian offenses and try to keep on tolerable relations with Moscow.

There was also the hope that there might, as time went on, be an improvement in those relations. It was hoped that sooner or later the moderates might come to the top in Moscow, and it was felt, especially in Labor and Liberal circles, that the best way to strengthen the moderates was to give the extremists the least possible justification for the cry that we were the principal enemies of Russia, that we were trying to band the world together against her, that it was, in fact, the duty of every Russian patriot to hate us and if necessary resist us.

For the Bolsheviki themselves and for their doctrines, there was and is no sympathy at home except among a small band of extreme radicals who are no more representative of British opinion than your "Reds" are of American opinion. No love has ever been lost between the responsible leaders of our Labor party and Moscow. The Bolsheviki seem to get as much satisfaction out of abuse of those leaders as they do out of abuse of Conservative politicians; while the principles of Moscow are as emphatically rejected and its methods are as thoroughly disliked

on the opposition benches of the present House of Commons as they are among Conservatives.

Even in 1924, when the Labor Government tried to create better relations between London and Moscow, there were no delusions among its leaders about Bolshevism. Some of the rank and file may have had prejudices in its favor, but I do not think I am wrong when I say that the chief motive which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had in recognizing the Moscow Government and in entering into negotiations with it was the utilitarian motive of trade, a desire to leave nothing untried that might increase the volume of our exports and thus decrease the number of our unemployed. A consolidation of Anglo-Russian relations would also have helped his policy of European appeasement and settlement upon which, as I told you in a previous lecture, he set so much store. He may in addition have had in mind the extreme wing of his party and its expectation that he would celebrate his entry into office by some act of reconciliation with Moscow. He may have felt that whether his move for closer relations failed or succeeded, his authority over that wing would have been increased by the mere fact that he had made it. If the negotiations succeeded, he would win the applause of a rather difficult section of his followers; if they failed, he would have proved to those followers the futility of their demand and expectations.

Mr. MacDonald at any rate made it quite clear to the Russians at the beginning of our negotiations with them that he was no believer in their doctrines. In his opening address at the conference, he turned towards the Russian delegation and said, with that frankness which often characterized his diplomacy:

In the course of your revolution, you resorted to methods which aroused the utmost fear and resentment elsewhere. . . . Your method of government is not the same as ours. The fundamental points of distinction have been well brought out since you left Moscow, I believe, in a diatribe directed against myself by Zinovieff. I welcome in its proper place the emphasizing of that distinction, because it is true, and because it is of great assistance to myself and my government.

What its leader meant was that our Labor party has, as you know, always refused to have anything to do with that small section of extremists who constitute the Communist party at home and that he was glad at the beginning of his term of office to have Moscow bear public testimony to the fact. Instead of encouraging class warfare, or what the Russians like to call the "revolution of the proletariat" the British Labor party ensues the reforms it desires by constitutional means; or as Zinovieff put it from his point of view, it is "mistakenly striving for class harmony, whereas without revolution and the smashing of the entire machinery of the state, it is futile to expect emancipation."

The policy of what may perhaps be called experimental patience adopted by all parties in office between 1921 and the beginning of this year was made the easier by another factor which is, I think, sometimes overlooked by foreign students of our politics.

I have heard in the last month members of this institute bewail the lack of interest of your general public in external problems. It is very much the same at home. Even the greatness of our stake in external affairs has not so far comprehensively interested our people in questions beyond the seas. There are, of

course, exceptions to this generalization, as there are to all generalizations. There are important sets of specialists of all classes and in various parts of the country who pay close attention to what is going on abroad. There are the banking and financial communities in London and other large centers. There are workingmen like the textile hands in Lancashire whose prosperity depends definitely and directly upon foreign conditions. In Lancashire, there is intense interest in your cotton crop, and equal interest in the course of events in India and China and other places where our cotton goods are sold. But on the whole, as is shown by the history of our industrial relations during the last ten years, both employers and workingmen are often strangely indifferent to the outside world and the necessity that there is for us to keep up our position in it as traders.

This indifference, or lack of imagination, coupled with our somewhat insular refusal to expect from the less intelligible kind of foreigner the same standards as we like to think that we practice ourselves, tended to make the average voter rather careless of Russian machinations. We were confident that they would not get far in our island. We have no large alien element such as you have among which the "Reds" can practice. British radicals and progressives were, moreover, affected by the fact that Bolshevism was after all the result of violent revolt against tsarism. They had been accustomed, before the War, to look upon the old régime in Russia as the last stronghold of undemocratic reaction, and they could not help hoping that, after swinging from one extreme to the other, Russian politics might settle down under some sort of democratic dispensation.

It has thus required a shock or rather a succession of shocks to bring home to us the true significance and possible dangers of the surreptitious war that Moscow has been carrying on against us. The Russian effort to finance the general strike last year was the first thing that really got under our skins.

During the early days of the strike, about \$125,000 of Russian money was sent to the Trade Union Congress. The money was indignantly refused by our trade union leaders. Later on, a larger sum was stopped and returned by the government. The mild protest which, true to its policy of patience, the Foreign Office registered against it, did not perhaps quite correspond with the effect upon public opinion of this effort to support a movement which, in spite of the orderliness and decency of its conduct, was generally regarded as unconstitutional and revolutionary.

Then came the weekly contributions from Russia to the funds of the miners during the six months' coal strike. Against those contributions the government could not protest. The strike was constitutional and the money came technically from the Russian Miners' Union. But the public utterances of the Bolshevik leaders made it clear that it was being contributed less out of class sympathy than out of a desire on the part of the Russians to prolong and aggravate a situation which they knew was eating into the very vitals of the British nation. A regular stream of manifestoes, spoken and written, were poured out of Moscow in those days and reproduced in the British press, gloating over the discomfiture of the government and the *bourgeoisie*, clamoring for the growth of a militant proletariat in Great

Britain so that the strike might be the harbinger of class warfare, abusing trade union leaders who were trying to use their good offices in order to shorten the strike, and so on.

“The three pillars of the world revolution are the Soviet state, the advance of the revolutionary armies in China, and the British coal strike.” So spoke Bukharin, a leading member of the Politbureau, or controlling committee of the Communist party, which is really the directing force of the government in Russia, and that sentence became the text of countless speeches and editorials in Russia during those months.

The crowning provocation of the coal strike period was, however, the extraordinary telegram which the Trade Union Congress received at its annual meeting during the autumn of last year from Tomskey, a leading Russian trade unionist and communist, who had been a delegate at the London Conference in 1924. On this occasion Tomskey had not been allowed to land in England to attend the meeting. In his telegram he attacked the British Government for excluding him, an action which he said amounted to an effort to control the policy of the British trade union movement. That action moreover was, he considered, the fault of the obsequiousness of certain British trade union leaders towards the government, of men who were too loyal to capitalism and too disloyal to the working classes. Upon those trade union leaders, Tomskey continued, rested the responsibility for the failure of the general strike. Had the British workingmen had at that time other leaders and had those leaders employed other tactics, the British

working class would not be increasingly on the defensive but would be marching victoriously forward.

In circulating this message to the delegates at the Trade Union Congress, the General Council of the Congress registered a strong protest against what it called a most regrettable abuse of ordinary courtesies and said that it had no intention of replying to such ill-instructed and presumptuous criticism, which was in point of fact an intolerable interference in British trade union affairs.

Then came the Bolshevik campaign against us in China. All through the southern advances and successes last winter, Moscow was continually gloating and boasting over its share in mobilizing the Chinese nationalists to the discomfiture of British imperialism. There again Bukharin's statement which I gave you just now, and others like it, were taken up and enlarged upon and embroidered with that vociferousness which is such a characteristic of modern Moscow.

The Arcos raid revelations, had they been an isolated incident, might not have made a first-class sensation. But as it was they completed for the public the lesson started by the Zinovieff letter, reënforced by the Russian attitude towards the general strike, and carried on by the Russian propaganda in China. Moscow, it was suddenly realized, seemed in all parts of the world to be working, sometimes above, but more often below the surface, against us, our prosperity, and our organic institutions. Everybody was disgusted and disillusioned, except the extreme Conservatives, who rubbed their hands and cried: "I told you so." Members of the Labor and Liberal parties, who had hoped against hope in spite of

things like Tomsy's outburst, had to admit at any rate in private that Moscow was past praying for.

Such, roughly, are the reasons why I said that the break was psychologically inevitable and that it was really forced upon the government by the slow accumulation of public indignation. It was, of course, attacked in Parliament and elsewhere by the leaders of both the Labor and Liberal oppositions. Mr. Lloyd George asked what was the good of a gesture which would do nothing except destroy some much needed trade. The parliamentary leaders of the Labor party took the same line. There were, also, complaints that the ejection of its official representatives from London would not prevent Moscow from continuing its intrigue and propaganda in Great Britain. Sir Austen Chamberlain's previous statements that a break would be bad for the stability of Europe were thrown back in his teeth, and so on.

Personally, I cannot help feeling that there is at least a very good chance that the general advantages of the break will be found to outweigh its disadvantages. It is not yet clear that we are going to lose much trade with Russia. We have not had, since the War, a great deal of profitable trade to lose. In the years 1921 to 1926, Great Britain has bought about \$450,000,000 of goods from Russia and has sold only about \$40,000,000. For the United States during the same period, the corresponding figures were \$220,000,000, and \$120,000,000. An explanation, at any rate plausible, of these figures, which are not satisfactory to us who are so anxious to work up our export trade, is that the Bolsheviks only buy from us what they can get nowhere else. If this is so, they may well continue to buy from us to almost the same ex-

tent as they have been doing, after a few months of protestation and abstinence. And even if we are going to lose what is after all a relatively small amount of trade, it is at least possible that that small amount may, in the long run, prove to be well lost.

Lord Grey, who, though retired from active politics, still speaks on foreign affairs with an authority second to none, said in a speech a month or two ago that the expediency as opposed to the justification of the break required a good deal of thinking out, and that he considered that it would depend in the long run upon whether it suited the Bolsheviki or not. I cannot, of course, speak from very recent knowledge, as it is some time since I left England, but my impression is that the Bolsheviki may well have lost rather than gained by being turned out of London, that ejection will have tended to destroy the prestige which our recognition of them seemed to have given them. Many people, for instance, who know the Far East, which is, of course, one of their chief spheres of activity against us, had for some time been saying that their official recognition by us gave them considerable prestige there, that it enabled them to pose as people so adroit as to be able to fool us with one hand and to foil us with the other.

Certainly, for the moment, the Bolsheviki do seem to be losing influence in China, though, as I said the other evening, it would be rash to rely upon the deterioration of their position there continuing indefinitely.

Nor are there any signs that the rupture has had any immediate bad effects in central or eastern Europe. It almost looks as if, thanks to the solidification of the new Europe since the Dawes plan and

Locarno, the fears felt not so long ago, that a diplomatic break between Great Britain and Russia would unsettle Europe, are no longer justified.

I do not mean by that that Russia no longer constitutes a problem for Europe. She does present and must continue to present, potentially at any rate, a serious problem for Europe so long as her government is controlled by the professed enemies of western society. What I mean is that the condition of Europe now seems to be solid enough to weather without difficulty the temporary shock of our rupture with Russia. And that, after all, is the important thing; for if Russia in the years to come is again to be a disturbing factor in the affairs of the continent, she will be so for reasons which no continued half-relationship of ours with Moscow would be likely to prevent.

There remains the argument that the ejection of the official representatives of Moscow from London will not really have done anything to stop Russian propaganda and intrigue in the British Islands or anywhere else. That may be so, but after all does it very much matter? Their ejection certainly will not have facilitated Russian intrigue; and when all is said and done, is not the thing which really counts the fact that we should have come out into the open and should have recognized an inevitable situation, that we should, as Lord Grey put it in that speech of his to which I have already alluded, have stopped "pretending when things can neither be cured nor endured"?

Lord Grey, indeed, went to the root of the Russian situation with that sureness of touch which he often brings to bear upon international problems. The

Soviet Government, he said, was not conducting a Russian national policy. It was conducting a policy of world-wide revolution. It was trying not to promote Russian national interests but to cause revolution everywhere on the same pattern as it had been carried on in Russia. That was the difference between the Soviet Government and every other government in the world. The very essence of the policy of Moscow was that it aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of every other country. It wanted to overthrow other governments in order to see established governments of the same type as that in Moscow.

The Soviet Government, Lord Grey continued, was anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary. It was a dictatorship or despotism. It ruled not by consent, not through parliament, but by force. No public institution existed in Russia at the present moment without the approval of the Soviet Government. Those who thought that the Third International of Moscow worked in any way independently of the Soviet Government were therefore not facing the facts. Statements that the Soviet Government had nothing to do with the Third International were of just as much value as the statement that Borodin when in China was a private Russian citizen who had nothing to do with the Soviet Government.

But, it may be asked, if the Bolsheviks are so anti-national and anti-western, how is it that they appear always to be wanting to get into touch with the western world? Why are they always telling American, British, French, German, and other foreign men of affairs that they want to do business with them? May it not be that the moderates among them feel

that, if the Union of Soviet and Socialist Republics is to endure, it must gradually be brought into the paths of economic sanity and must settle down into an economic relationship with other nations such as will gradually preclude a continuance of subversive political and social activities abroad?

One cannot dogmatize about the future of Russia. In the end economic pressure may, of course, break or modify the Moscow régime. But one must always remember that except for a few large towns, Russia is still economically and socially a medieval country. She can probably exist for years in a state of chaos which for our countries would spell quick ruin. I cannot indeed help feeling that especially during the early years of the Bolshevik régime we were all misled by the tempting parallel between it and the French Revolution. Bolshevism, it used to be proclaimed, was a passing phase. It would soon burn itself out, just as the French Terror burned itself out.

There are, of course, obvious resemblances between the two movements. Both revolutions were regicide; both overturned an old monarchical and aristocratic order. Both pursued abroad a violent revolutionary propaganda. But the French Revolution, though it traveled the red road of the guillotine, was the product of a high western civilization. So far as political and social writers had any share in bringing it about, it was the result of the impact of the same western philosophy that in part inspired the foundation of the American union, upon the normal and natural discontents of the most advanced race in Europe.

Neither the shock of the revolution nor the twenty

years of warfare of which it was the prelude seriously retarded the development of France. They may have rendered French political institutions somewhat less stable during part of the nineteenth century, but nobody can pretend that either the revolution or the Napoleonic War set back or altered the nature of civilization in France. The French Revolution changed the government, but not the manners or ways of thought of a nation. It was in fact intensely national and produced the greatest wave of militant patriotism that Europe has ever seen.

Bolshevism, on the other hand, has profoundly changed the Russian State. It is, as Lord Grey pointed out, anti-national, whereas the old Russia was in many ways intensely national. It is anti-European, whereas the government at any rate of the old Russia was European. It has wiped out even the name of Russia from the official title of the country which it controls. Russia and Russian patriotism seem to be little more to its leaders than things to be offered up on the altar of the world revolution. Bolshevism has, of course, tried to mobilize the old Russian national instinct of Pan-Asiatic imperialism, but there is nothing to prove that it has done so to help Russia any more than it has interfered in the affairs of China to help the Chinese. Its object seems to be to use Russians and Chinese and anyone else it can lay its hands upon to promote its crusade against the political and social institutions of the West. Undoubtedly work is being done at Moscow for social and industrial betterment and so on. But that need not necessarily indicate anything beyond a desire on the part of the present rulers of Russia to strengthen her so as to make her an effective base for

their offensive against the headquarters of western civilization in Europe and in America and against the annexes of that civilization in the East. It may of course also be a sop to the more moderate and patriotic followers and colleagues of those who seem to rule in Moscow, and in time the moderates may win out. But for the present it would, I venture to think, be rash to build upon an eventuality of that sort.

When Moscow flirts with the representatives of capitalism in our countries, it does not in fact seem to be so much a case of a Russian Government trying to build up the Russian nation as of Bolshevism trying to borrow from the armory of western civilization the means for the destruction of that civilization. Some such supposition at any rate presents the only logical explanation of the otherwise completely illogical maze of contradictions and paradoxes which constitute contemporary Russian intercourse with the West and produce that extraordinary diplomatic cacophony which is constantly breaking out in Moscow.

Voices are heard there ceaselessly proclaiming a political and social jihad—or holy war—against the very foundations of our civilization and yet almost as ceaselessly other voices scold us in tones of outraged surprise and in the polished phrases of western diplomacy for daring to resent obvious breaches of international comity committed against us by the agents of that communistic jihad. At one moment we learn that the rulers of Russia have issued some devastating ukase against everything that smacks of the capitalistic system. At the next their representatives are importuning the bankers and statesmen

of western Europe to give them credits and otherwise to treat them as though they were orthodox members of international society.

A few months ago Russian representatives attended for the first time a conference summoned by the League of Nations, a conference convened to survey the economic situation of the world and to suggest remedies for the chief economic evils from which most of us are suffering. It was grotesque enough for those who have sworn to destroy our whole economic system to have chosen such an occasion for their *début* at Geneva, but that was not all. The Russian delegation wanted to secure credits or capital from abroad. Their chief preoccupation was, therefore, to antagonize no one and to depict the situation in Russia in the rosiest possible colors. The conference was still going on when we broke off diplomatic relations. Moscow ran amok in an excess of oriental frenzy. We were accused of doing against Bolshevism what Bolshevism is always doing against us, of trying to stir up a crusade against it. The assassination of Voikoff, who was implicated in the murder of the Tsar and his family, by a demented young Russian victim of the Bolshevik régime, turned this political hysteria into homicidal mania. A score of political prisoners, members of the old régime, were dragged from their cells in Moscow and shot.

Any result that Russian propaganda at Geneva might have had was thus worse than stultified.

In any case, after six years of disappointment we have come back to the policy which you in Washington have consistently adopted towards the Union of Soviet and Socialist Republics. I think I am safe

in saying that we are willing to enter into official relations with it again as soon as its government chooses to behave towards us as one civilized government should behave towards another. We have no desire to interfere with its internal affairs. If Russia likes to practice communism within her borders, we shall not interfere. All we ask is that she shall repay us in the same coin of non-interference, that she shall keep her doctrines for domestic consumption and not export them and push them upon us by propaganda and intrigue. When it is ready to make that concession to international comity we shall, I imagine, be willing to deal with Moscow again, though of course to make our relationship fruitful the Russian Government must also recognize in principle at any rate its liability for the debts which Russia owes abroad, for only so can Russia reëstablish her credit abroad and finance her foreign trade.

In the meantime we have no objection to our nationals trading with Russia. We have no objection even to the Russians keeping in operation in London the British chartered company called Arcos, through which Moscow traded and the premises of which occupied as they were in common with the Russian trade delegation were the scene of the famous raid, a concession of which the Russians are not so far as I know going to avail themselves for the present. Beyond that, however, we are unlikely to go until there has been a change of heart and policy in Moscow or a reversal of policy and sentiment in London of which there is for the present no sign.

And that brings me to the end. I have finished, as I began, with the word "trade," and I have used the same word at pretty frequent intervals in my lec-

tures. I am not going to apologize for having done so. I warned you that I proposed to keep as much as possible to the material side of things and to deal as much as possible with some of the practical aspects of our foreign policy and with the practical sanctions which lie behind that policy. Idealism and altruism are not, I hope, dead in England or in any other part of the Commonwealth of British Nations. But, as I said in my first lecture, British foreign policy is based primarily upon the material necessities of the British Islands, and there seemed to me no reason why that rather important fact should be allowed to lurk half-hidden behind a smoke screen of sentimental generalities.

On the contrary, I felt that it would, perhaps, serve the purposes of the institute better and would certainly be more satisfactory to me to try to carry some of you with me in developing the argument that British policy is really of some service to the world, not in spite of its being based upon the realism of national necessity but actually because it is based upon that realism. I therefore set myself to show you that our need for a settled world to trade in makes us work to promote international understanding, to bridge the gulf that exists between the eastern and western races, and so on, to work, in a word, in the interests of permanent peace more intensively and more continuously than any purely sentimental and altruistic stimulus could make us do.

I have tried to show you how our Labor party and our Conservative party formulated a policy of what perhaps may be called constructive liberalism in order to further these ends; how Labor, when in office, pursued a European policy which the Con-

servatives have in their turn carried on and developed; how the Conservatives are pursuing a Far Eastern policy with the general lines of which the Labor party is in agreement; and how, judging from the comment of the Imperial Conference last year, the policy of both parties seems to the other countries of the Empire to be part of a continual and not unsatisfactory whole.

I wish that I could have pursued my subject farther. I am painfully aware of the inadequacy of the picture which I have given you. I have missed out many things which I should have liked to discuss, and I must have left unanswered many questions which you would have liked to be answered. But the size and sweep of my subject has rendered such omissions inevitable. All I could do was to try to paint in roughly and crudely a few of its main features in the hopes of giving you some idea of the motives and tendencies and aspirations with which a better artist would have made his canvas live.

I am afraid that I have sometimes failed to seem to you entirely dispassionate and objective. But of that shortcoming I am not ashamed. For he would, as I think you will all agree, be a poor and bloodless creature who did not at times believe perhaps a little one-sidedly in the policy of his own country. I should, in fact, be quite content if I could feel that I have shown you that British foreign policy is working in very much the same general direction in which American foreign policy is working, in the direction, in fact, in which liberal-minded people the world over want to see their governments move in their relations with other countries.

I do not know whether I have succeeded in con-

vincing any of you of this or of the other things which I set out to prove. I do know, however, that I have had a most stimulating and enjoyable time in trying to do so. I thank you most heartily for the kindness with which you have listened to me and have received me in Williamstown, and for the encouragement which you have given an amateur lecturer in his journey along an unaccustomed path.

INDEX

- Acham, A., 81
 Afghanistan, 20, 21, 22, 113
 Africa, 12, 18
 Allied countries, 25, 26, 31, 35,
 60, 63
 America, 128
 Antwerp, 17, 19
 Arabs, 74
 Arbitration, 59, 61, 62
 Arcos raid, 112, 121, 130
 Armament, 27; limitation of, *see*
 Disarmament
 Asia, 18, 75, 112
 Asiatics, 84
 Atlantic Ocean, 37, 45, 82
 Australasia, 21
 Australia, 11
 See also Dominions, British.
 Austria, 88; rehabilitation of, 29,
 65

 Backward races, 3
 Balance of power, 40, 48
 Baldwin, Stanley, 49, 50
 Belgium, 44, 48, 49, 62, 94
 Berlin, authorities at, 62, 64
 Bolshevism, 20, 27, 57, 70, 113,
 115-117, 118-129; China and,
 70, 73, 81, 82-86, 103, 107,
 120, 121, 123, 127
 See also Communism.
 Borodin, Jacob, 80, 81-82, 83, 84,
 85, 102, 107, 125
 Boxer uprising, 78; indemnity
 for, 95
 Boycotting, 67, 90, 92, 94, 102
 Briand, Aristide, 39, 41; quoted,
 65
 British Commonwealth, 114, 131
 British East India Company, 75
 British Empire, 2, 10, 18, 19-20,
 52, 71, 72-73, 84, 112, 132;
 Conference of, 132
 See also Dominions, British.
 British Isles, 17, 24, 86, 124, 131;
 ocean trade routes necessary
 to, 2 (*see also* Communica-
 tions, ocean, necessary to
 Great Britain)
 See also Great Britain.
 Bukharin, Nikolai I., 120, 121;
 quoted, 120
 Burke, Edmund, 3

 Cambridge University, 81
 Canada, 11
 See also Dominions, British.
 Canton, 67, 75, 83, 84, 85, 90, 94,
 95; Government at, 96, 98
 Capitalism, Russia and, 120, 125,
 128-129
 Carribean Sea, 21
 Central Powers, 87
 Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 53, 55,
 58, 59, 61-62, 99, 112, 115,
 122
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 11
 Channel, English, 37
 Chen, Eugene, 80-81, 82
 China, 118; and Bolshevism, 70,
 73, 81, 82-86, 103, 107, 120,
 121, 123, 127 (*see also* China
 and Russia); fall of empire
 in, 79; foreign concessions in,
 68, 90, 94, 100-103; foreign
 force in, 67, 68, 71, 77, 90,
 91-94, 96, 105; foreign power
 in, 12-13, 67-68, 69, 70-74, 77-
 79, 88, 92, 97, 98; foreign
 residents in, 71, 73, 89-90,

- 92, 93, 96, 101, 102, 103;
Great Britain and, 11, 12, 67-74, 75-78, 83-84, 86-105, 108-110, 121; and Great War, 87; lack of central government in, 67-68, 69-70, 79-80, 87, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 105-106, 107; nationalism in, 10, 67-68, 69-70, 71-72, 74, 78-79, 80, 82-86, 87, 89, 93-94, 96, 101, 104, 105-108; public opinion in, 106; and Russia, 67, 73, 78, 80, 85, 86, 87, 94, 102, 108, 111, 125 (*see also* China and Bolshevism); Southern Government in, 69, 70, 71, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89, 94, 95-96, 98, 102, 103-104, 106-107; tariff and customs of, 68, 69, 74, 88, 94-99, 100, 109; trade relations with, 10, 72-73, 74-78, 89, 90-91, 92, 99, 101, 104; trade with, value of, 72-73; treaties of, 68-70, 77, 85, 88, 89, 94, 96, 97-98, 99-100, 109; and western diplomacy, 87-89
See also Far East.
- Coal, 6, 48
- Communications, ocean, necessary to Great Britain, 2, 18, 19, 20, 23
See also Trade, necessary to Great Britain.
- Communism, 81-82, 83, 84, 107, 108, 114, 117, 120, 130
See also Bolshevism.
- Communist International, 81, 114, 125
- Coolidge, Calvin, 49
- Cotton, 6, 15, 118
- Cuba, 22
- Czecho-Slovakia, 40, 62
- Dawes, Charles G., 50
- Dawes Commission, *see* Reparation Commission
- Dawes Conference, 53, 53-54, 57, 60
See also London Reparation Conference.
- Dawes Plan, 29, 38, 50, 58, 60, 123
- Debts, Chinese, 73; interallied, 52; Russian, 114, 130
- Democracy, 83, 118, 125; in China, 105-106
- Diplomacy, secret, 55-56
- Diplomacy of Europe since the Versailles Treaty*, 24
- Disarmament, 4, 35, 57, 63-64
- Dominions, British, 11, 40, 59
- East, 113, 128
See also Far East; Near East.
- Egypt, 19, 20, 22
- England, *see* Great Britain
- Europe, 66 *and passim*; and British isolation, 11, 37, 41, 51, 59; Central, 27, 41, 115, 123; Eastern, 6, 27, 40, 58, 123; Russia and, 111, 115, 122, 123-124, 127; Western, 17, 27, 33, 41, 58; wrecked by Great War, 10
- Extraterritoriality, 68-69, 85, 88, 96, 100, 102, 109; Commission on, 96, 100
- Far East, 9, 72, 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 123, 132; markets of, 10; trade with, 74-75; western residents in, 89-91
- Finance, 118; international, 10, 14, 16; public, 27, 64; Russian, 130
- Foch, Ferdinand, 33
- Foodstuffs, 2, 6, 11, 18, 23, 115

- France, 66, 113; alliances of, 40; and China, 73, 77, 94, 94-95; Conservative party in, 54; economic decline of, 8; empire of, 18; finances of, 52, 64-65 (*see also* France and reparation); and Germany, 32-36, 40, 44-47, 48-49, 51-52, 60, 62, 64; and Great Britain, 17-18, 34-36, 39-44, 51-55, 58, 62; military force of, 43, 51, 52; nationalism in, 127; population of, 8; public opinion in, 25, 31, 42; and reparation, 41-45, 47, 50, 52; revolution in, 7, 8, 126-127; security for, 30, 31, 32-36, 39-41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 57, 58, 59, 62; Socialist party in, 55; trade of, 8, 73
See also Ruhr, the.
- French Revolution, 7, 8, 126-127
- Geneva, 29, 55, 59, 61, 111, 129
- Geneva Protocol, *see* Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
- George III, 75
- German Empire, 17, 19, 32; commercial expansion of, 9
See also Germany.
- Germany, 60-65, 66; and China, 73, 88; disarmament of, 35; and France, 32-36, 40, 44-47, 48-49, 51-52, 60, 62, 64; industrialists in, 42, 44, 45, 47; and League of Nations, 30, 57, 60, 62, 63; nationalism in, 47; and reparation, *see* Reparation; Separatist movement in, 46; unity of, 33, 34, 45-46
See also German Empire.
- Gibbon, Edward, 75
- Gibraltar, Straits of, 19
- Glasgow, 82
- Great Britain, *passim*; coal strike in, 119-120; Communist party in, 114, 117; Conservative party in, 49, 51, 59, 111, 114, 115-116, 121, 131-132; general strike in, 119, 120, 121; House of Commons of, 3, 116; industrial and commercial expansion of, 7-10, 48; Labor party in, 42, 49, 51, 54, 57, 59, 111, 113-114, 115-117, 121-122, 131-132; Liberal party in, 111, 121-122; Parliament of, 114, 122; and paternalism, 13-14; population of, 6, 8; public opinion in, 25, 31, 40-41, 42-43, 51, 58, 59, 74, 84, 86-87, 89, 110, 111, 114-115, 117-119, 122; trade unions in, 119, 120-121; unemployment in, 7, 116; war debt of, 52
See also British Isles.
- Greece, 3
- Grey of Fallodon, Edward Grey, Earl, 29, 123, 124-125, 127; quoted, 124
- Grusenbergl, Michael, *see* Borodin, Jacob
- Guantánamo, 22
- Hankow, 90, 99, 101, 102-103, 104
- Hay, John, 13, 78, 97, 99
- Herriot, Édouard, 54, 55
- Hobbes, Thomas, 4
- Hongkong, 72, 94
- Hughes, Charles Evans, 49-50
- Hungary, rehabilitation of, 29, 65
- Immigration, Oriental, 59
- Imperialism, 8; British, 67, 121; German, 32; Russian, 127

- Imperial preference, 11, 12
 India, 20, 21, 113, 118; nationalism in, 10
 Interdependence of states, 5, 65
 International coöperation, 25
 International services, 4
 Iraq, 14, 21
 Iron, 6
 Isolation, 11, 23, 37, 40-41, 51, 59
 Italy, 3, 48, 62, 65

 Japan, 86; and China, 73, 87, 93, 94; commercial development of, 9
 Jordan, Sir John, 108-110; quoted, 109
 Jugo-Slavia, 40

 Kellogg, F. B., 69, 70; quoted, 69
 Kiukiang, 103
 Kuo Min Tang, 80, 82, 83

 Lancashire, 15, 118
 Latin-America, 22
 Law, public, 28
 League of Nations, 4, 13, 21, 30, 32, 34-36, 38-39, 55, 57, 61, 129; Assembly of, 55; Council of, 29, 55, 59, 62, 63, 111; Covenant of, 13, 36, 59, 61, 62; Economic Section of, 15; work of, 28-30, 65
 Little Entente, 40
 Lloyd George, David, 92, 114, 122
 Locarno, Conference at, 53, 64, 124; Pact of, 18-19, 30, 38, 41, 61-63, 65
 London, 42, 66, 81, 82, 83-84, 84, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 123, 124, 130; authorities at, 49, 69, 90, 91, 106, 111
 London Conference (of 1924, with Soviet representatives), 116, 120

 London Reparation Conference, 50
See also Dawes Conference.

 Macao, 75
 MacDonald, Ramsay, 49, 51, 52, 53-55, 56-59, 60, 116-117; quoted, 51-52, 52, 117
 Maggiore, Lake, 53
 Manchu Empire, 79
 Mandates, 13, 21
 Markets, 6, 9, 10-11, 16, 23, 48, 77
 McKinley, William, 78
 Mediterranean Sea, 19
 Mercantilist theory, 12, 16-17
 Mesopotamia, 14
 Mexico, 82
 Middle Kingdom, 74
 Missionaries, 73, 100
 Monroe Doctrine, 22
 Moscow, 117, 129; government at, 65, 81, 85, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 125, 126, 130; international activities of, 81, 84, 113, 119, 121-122, 124-126, 127-128
 Moslems, 19

 Nanking, 90; Government at, 104
 Napoleon, 17
 Napoleonic War, 7, 8, 37, 76, 127
 Nationalism, 10, 25, 83; Chinese, 10, 67-68, 69-70, 71-72, 74, 78-79, 80, 82-86, 87, 89, 93-94, 96, 101, 104, 105-108; French, 127; German, 47; Russian, 125, 127
 Near East, 13, 19, 20, 93
 New Haven, Hughes' speech at, 49
 New York, 84
 Nicholas II, 129

- Oil, 13, 14, 20, 21
 "Open door" policy, 12-13, 78, 99, 104, 109
- Palestine, 19
 Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Viscount, 90
 Panama, Isthmus of, 22
 Panama, Republic of, 22
 Panama Canal, 21-22
 Paris, 26, 28, 38, 42, 62, 109
 Paternalism, 13-14
 Peace, 2, 6, 13, 18, 23, 57, 70, 72, 131
 Peace Conference, 13, 24, 25-28, 30-32, 33-35, 36, 37-39, 87, 108, 109
 Peace Treaties, *see* Versailles, Treaty of
 Peking, 75, 80, 96, 97, 108; American Minister at, 109; Government at, 70, 80, 85, 87, 94, 95, 99, 103, 106, 107; Tariff Conference at, 88, 94-96
 Persia, 19, 20, 21, 22, 113
 Persians, 74
 Philippines, 72
 Pitt, William (Earl of Chatham), 3
 Platt Amendment, 22
 Poincaré, Raymond, 51, 53, 54
 Poland, 41, 58, 59, 61, 62; alliances of, 40
 Politbureau, 120
 Portugal, 73, 75
 Press, 56, 63; British, 42, 74, 84, 119
 Propaganda, 82, 84, 85, 102, 119, 122, 124, 129; anti-British, 84, 112-114, 121
 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 59-61
- Public opinion, 38; Allied, 25, 31; American, 39, 41, 87, 117; British, 40-41, 42-43, 51, 58, 59, 74, 84, 86-87, 89, 110, 111, 114-115, 117-119, 122; British, in Far East, 90, 91; Chinese, 106; and external affairs, 117-118; French, 42
- Raw materials, 6
 Reinhold, Peter, 41, 44, 46, 49
 Reparation, 25, 30, 31-32, 38, 41-45, 46, 47-55, 56-57, 58
See also Reparation Commission.
 Reparation Commission, 32, 36, 44, 49-50, 52, 57
 Reparation Conference, London, 50
 Rhine, R., 30, 31, 33-34, 35, 44, 46; occupied areas on, 60, 63, 64
 Rome, Imperial, 74-75
 Rubber, 14-15
 Ruhr, the, 44-49, 51, 56, 64, 66
 Rumania, 40
 Russia, 10, 19, 26-27, 65, 83; and China, 67, 73, 78, 80, 85, 86, 87, 94, 102, 108, 111, 125 (*see also* China and Bolshevism); effect of Bolshevism on, 126-127; and Europe, 65, 111, 115, 122, 123-124, 127-129; Great Britain and, 11, 20, 57, 86, 111-124, 129-130; moderates in, 115; nationalism in, 125, 127; strike contributions of, 119; Trade Agreement of 1921 with, 112, 113; trade with, 112, 114-115, 116, 122-123, 130
See also Bolshevism; Moscow,

- Government at; Soviet and Socialist Republics, Union of. Russian Miners' Union, 119
- Salter, Sir Arthur, 15-16; quoted, 16
- Sanctions, 59
- Security, 2, 17-22, 23, 48, 52, 57, 58-63, 70-71, 72, 131; for France, 30, 31, 32-36, 39-41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 57, 58, 59, 62
- Self-determination, 20, 21, 22, 77, 103-104, 105
- Sforza, Count Carlo, 24, 24 n, 25, 26, 38, 58
- Shameen, 94
- Shanghai, 83, 93, 94, 101, 102; International Settlement of, 71, 93, 100, 101
- Shantung, 87
- Shipping, in China, 73, 91; free, 12
- Silk, 75
- Socialism, 55
- Soviet and Socialist Republics, Union of, 112, 113, 120, 125-126, 129
See also Moscow, Government at; Russia.
- Spain, 6, 82
- Spheres of influence, 12, 23, 77-78
- Stalin, Ivan V., quoted, 113
- Steel, 6
- Stinnes, Hugo, 42
- Stresemann, Gustav, quoted, 65-66
- Suez Canal, 19, 20, 21-22
- Sun Yat-sen, 83, 84-86, 106, 107
- Tariff, 10; American, 9, 15; Chinese, 68, 69, 88, 94-99, 100, 109; for protection, 12, 13, 15, 16
- Teheran, Government at, 20, 21
- Textile industries, 6, 9, 15, 93, 118
- Third International, 114, 125
- Tientsin, 103; British Municipal Council at, 100
- Tomsky, L., 120, 122
- Trade, 9-17, 57, 65, 70, 72, 76, 130-131; boycotted, 67, 90, 92, 94, 102; with China, 72-73, 74-78, 89, 90-91, 92, 99, 101, 104; free, 12, 13, 15-17; French, 8, 73; necessary to Great Britain, 2, 5-7, 11, 12, 16, 23, 24, 58, 118, 131
- Trade Union Congress, British, 119, 120, 121; General Council of, 121
- Trade unions, British, 119, 120-121
- Trinidad, 80, 81
- Tuchuns, 79-80, 83
- Turkestan, 113
- Turkey, 19-20, 88, 92
- Turkish Petroleum Company, 14
- Unemployment, 57; British, 7, 116
- United States of America, 8-9, 10, 13, 32, 46, 82, 126, 132; British trade with, 122; and China, 69, 72, 73, 78, 90, 92; Communism in, 115, 118; Department of Agriculture of, 15; Department of State of, 14; and French security, 34-36, 39, 40; and isolation, 23, 36-38, 41; and League of Nations, 13, 36; and paternalism, 14; public opinion in, 39, 41, 87, 117; and Reparation Commission, 49-50; Senate of, 36, 37, 39, 69; tariff of, 9, 15; and war debts, 52; War of Independence of, 3

- Versailles, Treaty of, 28, 29, 30,
31, 35, 36, 38, 39, 44, 48,
51, 60, 64, 65, 87, 88
- Voikoff, Peter, 129
- War, 4-5, 92-93; elimination of,
5, 65; a menace to trade, 2,
6
- War of 1914-1918, 10, 11, 13, 16,
19, 20, 25, 26, 29, 32, 37, 44,
48, 51, 54, 60, 63, 64, 85;
effect of, on Great Britain,
7, 10, 11, 24, 32
- Washington, D. C., authorities at,
91, 129
- Washington Conference, 39, 68,
69-70, 89, 94-100, 104-105,
108, 109
- Washington Treaties, 87, 94, 97
- Wei-Hai-Wei, 87
- William II, 19, 25
- Williamstown, 133
- Wilson, Woodrow, 37, 38-39, 41,
58
- Yangtse, R., 103
- Yuan Shi-k'ai, 79
- Zinovieff, Grigori, 114, 117, 121;
quoted, 117

